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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are a popular class of distributed collaborative 
networks finding suitability from medical to military applications. However, their 
vulnerability to capture, their “open” wireless interfaces, limited battery life, all result 
in potential vulnerabilities. WSN-based services inherit these vulnerabilities. We 
focus on tactical environments where sensor nodes play complex roles in data 
sensing, aggregation and decision making. Services in such environments demand a 
high level of reliability and robustness.   
The first problem we studied is robust target localization. Location 
information is important for surveillance, monitoring, secure routing, intrusion 
detection, on-demand services etc. Target localization means tracing the path of 
moving entities through some known surveillance area. In a tactical environment, an 
adversary can often capture nodes and supply incorrect surveillance data to the 
system. In this thesis we create a target localization protocol that is robust against 
large amounts of such falsified data. Location estimates are generated by a Bayesian 
  
maximum-likelihood estimator. In order to achieve improved results with respect to 
fraudulent data attacks, we introduce various protection mechanisms. Further, our 
novel approach of employing watchdog nodes improves our ability to detect 
anomalies reducing the impact of an adversarial attack and limiting the amount of 
falsified data that gets accepted into the system. By concealing and altering the 
location where data is aggregated, we restrict the adversary to making probabilistic 
“guess” attacks at best, and increase robustness further. By formulating the problem 
of robust node localization under adversarial settings and casting it as a multivariate 
optimization problem, we solve for the system design parameters that correspond to 
the optimal solution. Together this results in a highly robust protocol design.  
In order for any collaboration to succeed, collaborating entities must have the 
same relative sense of time. This ensures that any measurements, surveillance data, 
mission commands, etc will be processed in the same epoch they are intended to 
serve. In most cases, data disseminated in a WSN is transient in nature, and applies 
for a short period of time. New data routinely replaces old data. It is imperative that 
data be placed in its correct time context; therefore, as a secondary problem, we 
studied time synchronization in WSNs. We designed a single hop time 
synchronization protocol, and then extended it to cover multi-hop scenarios. Our use 
of hash chains, a simple cryptographic mechanism, enabled the creation of a 
lightweight protocol that is resilient to various attacks. We also identified certain 
attack cases that our protocol is not robust against, and indicated possible means for 
securing against these attacks. We also showed that our protocol is efficient in 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Distributed and Collaborative systems have become pervasive in many environments 
today due to their modularity, scalability, redundancy, fault tolerance, ease of repair 
without loss of functionality, etc.  Some examples of distributed systems that have 
become all-pervasive are peer-to-peer file sharing networks, shared server clusters like 
Storage Area Networks (SANs), coalition networks, mobile agents and Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs). Usually, in these systems, there exists some form of coalition to share 
data and resources, or to make decisions collaboratively. While these systems are 
immensely popular, their flexibility, collaborative and dynamic nature has opened up 
many security problems. For example, WSNs are susceptible to eavesdropping, jamming, 
insertion as well as masquerading attacks. A distributed network that is collaborative in 
nature (shares data or resources between components of the network) is particularly 
susceptible to the individual components being compromised or the communication 
between individual components becoming unreliable. An intelligent adversary can disrupt 
communication between various components that together provide a service. In order to 
provide truly reliable functionality and dependability, these systems must be protected 
from malicious attacks, and their security becomes a very important issue for successful 
and secure deployment of distributed collaborative networks. Distributed collaborative 
networks usually run one or more collaborative services. 
Collaborative services entail the use of shared resources, create and rely on joint 
infrastructures, are involved in taking global measurements to provide a global view, or 
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to make joint decisions based on available information. In a distributed system, 
collaborative services are targets for malicious attackers who wish to foil the global 
measurement or the decision making process. A WSN is an example of a highly 
collaborative system that exhibits properties like using shared resources, forming joint 
infrastructures, taking global measurements, and sometimes making joint decisions. 
WSNs have gained tremendous popularity due to their fast and efficient deployment 
and self-organization in a wide variety of scenarios where a fixed networking 
infrastructure is not possible. They can be viewed as a completely distributed system with 
collaborating entities. The primary goal of a WSN is to provide collaborative services in 
a distributed (decentralized) manner, for example, sensing, monitoring, information 
aggregation, data communication and routing. However, compared to other distributed 
networks they have additional constraints. They are subject to power consumption 
restrictions (due to limited battery life), have limited communication bandwidth, limited 
and unsecured storage which is subject to capture, lower computation ability, and 
openness associated with wireless interfaces. This nature of a WSN makes it vulnerable 
to protocol attacks like capture, eavesdropping, fabrication, service disruption, etc. 
Furthermore, there are various points in the network where an adversary can insert bogus 
data, alter data, or capture nodes and use them to send fictitious data resulting in a 
substantially different outcome. It is interesting to see how one can build secure 
collaborative services for such vulnerable environments that can withstand highly 
malicious behavior, tolerate false data and at the same time are easy to setup and 
configure in remote locations. In this thesis, we design two robust collaborative services 
for WSNs that are lightweight in terms of the computation and communication involved, 
 2
 
provide the desired service in a robust manner by tolerating a substantially large amount 
of false misleading data. These two services are Robust Target Localization and Robust 
Time Synchronization. Our approach is built on the following principles:  
- Practical assumptions,  
- Light weight algorithms to provide desired service 
- Improved robustness of the service by leveraging intelligence from the existing 
network to keep adversarial behavior in check,  
- Use of cryptography to protect confidentiality of data, and message authenticity as 
necessary, to protect communication and improve resilience of the protocol.  
 
1.1 Problem Introduction 
Our work is primarily focused on military and tactical environments where sensor 
nodes play complex roles in data sensing as well as aggregation in a reliable and robust 
manner. The applications WSNs are being used for in such a tactical environment 
demand a high level of reliability and robustness.    
The first robust service we would like to build is a Target Localization Service, which 
is essentially a location tracking service. Location information is important for various 
critical and non-critical services like mitigating Sybil1 attacks, secure routing, sensing 
and tracking, surveillance, monitoring, intrusion detection, value-added services and on-
demand services to name a few. Lately, various government programs like LOCO [53], 
                                                 
1 A Sybil attack is one where a single physical entity assumes multiple identities. Each identity is used to 
siphon shared resources resulting in the Sybil node receiving a disproportionate share of resources. A Sybil 
can use its disproportionate resources to launch other attacks on the network. Cloning or replication 
involves assigning the same identity to multiple physical nodes, often after capture. We follow the 
approach of [46] and consider cloning attacks to be orthogonal to Sybil attacks.  
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APWN [9] and WAND [84] have shown great interest in robust WSN node localization 
and tracking in tactical environments. If the WSN provides other add-on services that 
depend on location information for disambiguation or implicit authentication, then the 
reliability and security of the localization and tracking service is vital to the success of 
the rest of the network. If target position is being estimated in a distributed manner, i.e., 
using multiple sensor nodes, then these nodes require loose single-hop synchronization 
among themselves. This is not impossible to achieve in practice and ensures that 
measurements taken during the same epoch will be collected and processed in the same 
iteration.  
Target Localization or tracking deals with tracing the path of (usually moving) entities 
through some surveillance area where tracking devices may be deployed. The salient 
difference between tracking and most localization schemes in the broad sense is that in 
the localization schemes, nodes compute their own location in the field using various 
schemes thereby localizing themselves, whereas in location tracking schemes the 
surrounding nodes compute the location of the target using various schemes thereby 
tracking the target. Smart applications that use such topological and real-time tracking 
information are: traceback schemes [52], disaster relief, on-demand services, patient 
monitoring, surveillance, tactical applications, traffic monitoring, military and homeland 
security applications like military vehicle, detecting self healing land mines, monitoring, 
intrusion detection and intrusion prevention, etc to name a few. The lack of robust 




As a secondary problem, we examine time synchronization as a collaborative service 
that we would like to secure against tactical adversarial behavior. In a distributed 
collaborating environment, time is a critically important element. In order for any 
collaboration to succeed, all collaborating entities must have the same relative sense of 
time. This ensures that any measurements, surveillance data, mission commands, etc will 
be processed in the same epoch they are intended to serve. In most cases, data 
disseminated in a WSN is transient in nature, and applies only for a short period of time. 
New data routinely replaces old data. Therefore, it is imperative that data always be 
placed in its correct time context. A protocol for a distributed system maybe highly 
secure with the provably strongest cryptosystems one can bring to bear. Instead of 
attacking the cryptosystem, an intelligent adversary can simply desynchronize the 
collaborating entities or change timestamps associated with messages to cause the 
application (and the system) to function erroneously or even breakdown. Therefore, time 
is a critical element that must be protected, especially in a distributed network. In the 
second part of this thesis, we show that our proposed secure and resilient time 
synchronization algorithm can ensure a well bounded real-time maximum 
synchronization error within the network even in the face of various attacks.  
 
1.2 Our Contributions 
In the first part of this thesis, we formulate and solve the problem of robust target 
localization, and in the second part we address the problem of robust time 
synchronization. To achieve robust target localization: 
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a) We examined the necessary and sufficient security requirements for target 
localization and its participants to communicate securely (since the protocol is 
distributed) and applied appropriate protection mechanisms to the various 
components. (Section 3.3) 
b) At the heart of the protocol is a particle filtering algorithm, which is a Bayesian 
maximum likelihood multi-step estimator. The particle filtering algorithm accepts 
samples (inputs) from various nodes surrounding a target, and attaches 
probabilistic weights to each of them. These weights are approximations to the 
relative posterior probabilities of the sample measurement representing the target 
and sum up to 1. The next step involves resampling the measurements to replacing 
older degrading measurements with newer updated measurements thereby 
improving upon the earlier estimate and creating a trajectory, tracing the path of 
the target through the deployment. By nature, particle filters are complex, 
expensive and have a certain degree of error associated with the measurements. 
They, however, have excellent tracking capabilities as they generate new estimates 
incrementally over older ones. By making the particle filtering algorithm 
distributed, the complexity and operational cost to the network is distributed across 
multiple nodes. Some nodes perform sensing and data relay operations while 
others perform the actual aggregation (estimation). In order to achieve improved 
results (with respect to fraudulent data) attacks, we applied data integrity and 
privacy protection mechanisms at the sensing nodes to enable secure and reliable 
communication. Additionally, the privacy mechanism shields the measurement 
data from an adversary who can now, in its best attempt, only probabilistically 
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guess and insert malicious data if it possesses an authentic key. Message 
authenticity ensures that a message cannot be altered in transit in an undetectable 
manner. Additionally, we establish a general bound on the validity of 
measurements with loose time synchronization, whereby replay attacks are 
mitigated. Therefore, we are able to reduce adversarial impact significantly.   
c) Our novel approach of employing watchdog nodes that provide sanity checks in 
terms of distance bounds, frequency of message input and anomalous behavior 
both in the presence and absence of activity, enables detection of certain 
inconsistencies and elimination of anomalous data and behavior at the aggregator. 
(Section 2.3.4) This further reduces the impact of an adversarial attack, and 
narrows the amount of falsified data that gets accepted into the aggregator. 
d) At the aggregator side where data is fused to provide a meaningful interpretation 
(target estimate), aggregator failure or compromise can result in a point of failure. 
We increase the robustness of the protocol to single point of failures by shifting 
the aggregation function from one leader node to another in real time as the target 
moves through the sensing field. At most, this results in a temporary failure if an 
aggregator malfunctions. Target estimation resumes as soon as the target moves 
into the vicinity of the next leader node.  Furthermore, without any additional 
overhead, moving the aggregator function across the network improves the 
resilience of the protocol to powerful attacks like adaptive node capture. Earlier, if 
an adversary had to capture a majority of nodes in a neighborhood to cause the 
outcome to degrade, it now has the extremely hard and impractical task of first 
guessing the next leader who will bear the aggregation function, and then 
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compromise a majority of nodes in that neighborhood within the short amount of 
time that the aggregation function is resident on that leader. This provides a 
substantial amount of resilience to the protocol.  
e) We formulated the problem of robust node localization under adversarial settings 
and cast it as a multivariate optimization problem allowing us to solve for the 
system design parameters that correspond to the optimal solution. (Section 3.2) 
Our novel use of the Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) 
technique to cast adversarial behavior as perturbation resulted in solving the multi-
variate optimization problem with only 2 measurements of the objective function 
per iteration (irrespective of the dimensions of the optimization problem). This 
resulted in a significantly lightweight solution compared to regular particle 
filtering that is also real-time efficient and facilitates online target location 
estimation. (Section 3.2)  
f) For the problem cast above, we have also shown how the solution is δ-robust (see 
section 3.2 for definition) under maximum undetectable contamination of the 
input, data and loss of a bounded number of honest, functional players to an 
adversary. 
g) We derived a lower bound on the number of particles that must be active in the 
particle filter in order to ensure that the solution is always δ-robust. 
h) We examined the dependencies associated with this solution and their effects on 
the outcome. (Section 3.4) 
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i) Finally, our decision to design the network  as a heterogeneous WSN (using nodes 
with varying capabilities) helps achieve lower hardware cost and extends mission 
life. 
As a secondary problem, we examined and designed a robust time synchronization 
service. We primarily designed a single hop time synchronization protocol to provide this 
service and then extended the same to cover multi-hop scenarios. 
a) We addressed the problem of robust time synchronization and identify the various 
properties that are necessary to assure the same.  
b) We designed a robust single hop time synchronization protocol using a simple 
cryptographic mechanism called hash chains. Using this mechanism we have been 
able to create a light weight protocol that provides resilience to various attacks like 
replay, redirection, etc. (Section 4.3)  
c) We showed that our protocol is robust against various adversarial attacks. (Section 
5.1) We also identified certain attack cases that our protocol is not robust against, 
and indicated possible means for securing against these attacks.  
d) We also showed that our protocol is efficient in computation and storage 
requirements for wireless sensor networks. 
Being closely coupled, these two services (Robust Target Localization and Robust 
Time Synchronization) together form a secure foundation for many WSN applications 
like geographic routing, pervasive computing, monitoring, surveillance, etc  
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we first provide an overview 
of existing work done in the area of sensor network localization (Section 2.1). In Section 
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2.2.1 we present the system model and in Section 2.2.2., we formally define the 
capabilities of the adversary and the performance bounds of an intelligent adversary. We 
then give an outline of our Robust Target Localization Protocol in (Section 2.2.3) and the 
protocol specification in Section 2.2.4. Finally, in section 2.3 we elaborate upon the novel 
features of the proposed protocol. Chapter 3 deals with the analysis of our protocol’s 
security and robustness under the influence of tactical adversaries. We formulate the 
attack model of the adversary, and in separate sections analyze the security, and 
robustness of the protocol under attack. We also list the various dependencies associated 
with the protocol and what their influence on the protocol outcome is, if any. Chapters 4 
and 5 deal with Robust Time Synchronization. In chapter 4, we first describe the current 
body of work in the area of both time synchronization as well as secure time 
synchronization (Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). We then enumerate the properties of a Robust 
Time Synchronization Protocol that are essential to a distributed collaborative network 
(Section 4.2). We describe the various components of our scheme in Section 4.3 and our 
proposed scheme in Section 4.4. Specifically, we formulate and discuss our adversary 
model in Section 4.4.1 and the protocol specification for both single and multi-hop 
synchronization in 4.4.3. In Chapter 5, we analyze the security of our protocol to show 
that it satisfies the properties specified in Section 4.2 sufficiently (Section 5.1). Finally, 
we conclude in Chapter 6 with a summary of our results and a glimpse of our proposed 






Chapter 2 Robust Target Localization 
In this chapter we first provide an overview of existing work done in the area of 
sensor network localization. We then present the system model and formally define 
the capabilities of the adversary. We then give an outline of our Robust Target 
Localization Protocol and the environment of operation. Next, we provide the 
protocol specification. Finally, we elaborate upon the novel features of the proposed 
protocol. 
 
2.1 Current Research in Secure and Robust Localization 
There are three main branches of localization namely, node localization, target 
localization and location service. Most contemporary research has been focused on 
node localization, with most researchers having proposed a number of location 
determining schemes for sensor networks in non-adversarial settings [8][34][64][65] 
[66][70]. Recently, few researchers have provided unique solutions for node 
localization in adversarial settings [21][50][51][63][71][73]. Though these techniques 
solve a multitude of problems, some of them use self-positioned verifiers, pre-shared 
secret keys, some perform only verification requiring the claimant to initiate, and 
some others rely on simplified assumptions that do not hold in practice. Since we are 
interested in a highly tactical deployment environment these schemes are unsuitable 
for our environment. Furthermore, some of these schemes rely on an inherent 
assumption that the self-positioned verifiers cannot become malicious or be 
 11
 
compromised. Since we are expecting to deal with Byzantine behavior, practically 
speaking, every node is susceptible and we cannot rely on such schemes.  
Location determination schemes can be broadly classified into range dependent and 
range-independent schemes. The former schemes rely on time, angle, received signal 
strength, power measurements or measurement of quantities that are a direct measure 
of the distance traveled by the signal. Range independent schemes do not utilize such 
techniques. For example, using wireless beacon messages, one hop connectivity 
information, etc. Another useful classification is centralized computation vs. de-
centralized computation of location, depending on where and how the location 
computation process takes place. For example, some nodes hand off their position 
estimates to a central node to compute target location while others each compute 
location themselves after gathering required information from their neighbors and the 
environment. Yet another useful classification is infrastructure-based and 
infrastructure-less schemes. The former are based on GPS and other external 
unchanging infrastructures, while the latter are independent of these. Our scheme falls 
under the range-independent, de-centralized and infrastructure-less schemes. Range 
dependent schemes based on Time of Arrival (TOA)[72][10], Time Difference of 
Arrival (TDOA) [4][64], Angle of Arrival (AOA)[22], and Received Signal Strength 
Indicator (RSSI)[66] to name a few, are meant for non-adversarial scenarios and are 
easily susceptible to failure in the presence of adversaries. Similarly, range-
independent schemes like [62] are also susceptible to various attacks like Sybil 
attacks, wormhole attacks etc. Two secure localization protocols proposed by 
researchers recently viz., SeRLoc [50] and Secure Positioning [71] were also 
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analyzed. These protocols have been created for adversarial scenarios and are secure 
against many attacks. However, they have heavy dependencies on trusted locators or 
verifiers, directional antennas (expensive hardware), GPS based static infrastructure, 
and have computational and storage overheads. Particularly, few drawbacks of 
SeRLoc include dependency on GPS-based locators, hardware requirement of special 
spatial/sectored antennas, high power transmission requirement for the locators, pre-
deployment knowledge and pre-loaded cryptographic quantities (keys, hash tables). 
Moreover, they assume locators are trustworthy and cannot be compromised by an 
adversary, DoS attacks are not considered since they are MAC level attacks, jamming 
is not considered since it can be easily eliminated by Spread Spectrum and coding 
techniques, locator communication range R must be known apriori by sensors, and the 
scheme has a high computational overhead as sensor nodes perform heavy 
computation to determine location based on beacon information. Further, this solution 
trades computational expense for resolution in that the centre of gravity (CoG) is 
computed using a grid system to improve computational expense due to which 
resolution is diminished. To further refine position, grid resolution must be increased, 
causing increased computation and processing time. From a security perspective, the 
use of a shared symmetric key only prevents external adversarial attacks but is still 
prone to insider and node compromise attacks. To their credit SeRLoc is, however, 
robust and accurate in the presence of Sybil, select wormhole and various other 
attacks compared to most other solutions in this area. Rope [51], a successor to 
SeRLoc, which provides all the benefits associated with SeRLoc’s sectored antennas, 
as well as some new properties like distance bounding fares well, but still carries 
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most deficiencies associated with SeRLoc like expensive hardware requirements, 
high computational cost, etc. Secure Positioning [71], another secure localization 
solution is based on trilateration using static infrastructure. Here, verifiers of the 
boundary triangle are part of the infrastructure and are assumed to be trustworthy and 
never compromised. This protocol is vulnerable to a wormhole attack. Further, it uses 
least median square method to dampen error due to contamination of distance 
estimates. This method, as a result, suffers from high degradation even at one-third 
contamination.  
In conclusion, most secure and non-secure protocols are based on assumptions that 
are sometimes impractical, and at other times too rigid to facilitate truly ubiquitous 
and mobile applications. We are therefore motivated to build a secure target 
localization protocol that does not have a fixed infrastructure, can localize moving 
targets, is light-weight and efficient in computation as well as communication, and is 
robust and secure to the desired degree against false data in highly adversarial 
scenarios. 
 
2.2 Our Approach to Robust Target Localization 
2.2.1 System Model & Assumptions 
2.2.1.1 Sensor Model 
Our design incorporates heterogeneous capability devices. We mainly have two 
types of sensor nodes, type A and B. Type A sensor nodes are long range, low power, 
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high battery life high end sensor nodes that are used for data aggregation, transmitting 
long distances, and memory intensive operations. They are also known as 
aggregators or leader nodes. Computation costs, memory usage and storage are 
normally not a concern to these types of nodes. These nodes are typically capture 
resistant or very hard to capture. Type B nodes have a substantially short range of 
operation, and have lesser resources. These are mainly used only as 1-hop sensing 
and relay elements, and can be captured by a reasonably strong adversary. 
As with any captured sensor node, all data, keys (if any) and resources of the 
captured sensor node are available to the attacker. All nodes obey protocols unless 
they malfunction or are malicious. All sensor node antenna types are known and 
calibrated. Sensor nodes need not always be stationary, but in our work, we assume 
stationary nodes to reduce uncertainties in the final outcome. These uncertainties can 
be modeled if the motion model of the sensors is defined. 
2.2.1.2 Trust Model 
Since all sensor nodes operate in an ad-hoc manner, no sensor node directly trusts 
another node. Type A sensor nodes, which compute the aggregated estimate of the 
position of the target, are assumed to function as per the algorithm unless 
malfunctioning, compromised or turned malicious. In other words, we trust all 
computations of good nodes, while communication between any nodes need not be 
trusted or reliable. All good Type B nodes obey protocol unless they are 
malfunctioning, compromised or turn malicious. The locations of the nodes in a 
neighborhood (cluster) are relatively known to the leader of the neighborhood. We 
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will show later on, that these location values need not be trusted by an aggregator as 
such discrepancies can be identified by neighborhood watchdogs. 
2.2.1.3 Assumptions 
This scheme relies on loose time synchronization within the sensing cell as well as 
between adjacent leader nodes. Since all synchronization events are single-hop, this is 
a very realistic assumption. Over time, internal clocks of different sensor nodes may 
drift apart, so resynchronization after some time maybe required. Most time 
synchronization schemes incorporate resynchronization techniques. In practice, this 
assumption is not hard to achieve and has been demonstrated successfully with very 
good results in similar distributed network architectures.  
The particle filtering algorithm which is used by type A nodes to compute an 
aggregate estimate of a target’s location cannot be altered in any way, shape or form. 
To an adversary it appears as a black box. If an aggregator node is compromised, an 
adversary can only supply malicious or malformed data to the particle filtering 
algorithm to influence the output. It cannot cause the algorithm to behave in a manner 
inconsistent with its nature. We assume all nodes in our setup to be stationary.  
2.2.1.4 Target State Model 
Since we do not stress on any particular technology to determine target 
measurements, we need a model describing the relationship between the states, 
velocity and other parameters of the moving object. This helps to relate incoming 
measurements to the target location based on known values like the previously known 
position of the target, its motion model (foot, car, military tank, etc), and new 
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incoming beliefs about the targets location. Typically measurements about a target 
can be signal strength measurements signifying range, ultra sound delay 
measurements, directional measurements, x-y coordinates and velocity information, 
etc. In our model, we use the x-y states and velocity information which is trivial to 
gather. Usually, for a particular deployment, one knows what it is tracking. For 
example, a foot soldier, or a battle tank will have a distinguishably different travel 
velocities.  
We represent the state transition model of the target as follows: 
1 ,   1,....,k k kx x u k−= Φ + Ψ = K
⎤⎦
 describes the sensor node at time k, where 





k k x k yx X V Y V⎡= ⎣
kx  with a period of observation θ  seconds, and is the 




k x yu u u⎡= ⎣ ⎤⎦
,k kX Y are the co-ordinates of the node, 
and are the x and y velocity components. are the x and y 
noise components.  
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, and  are the coefficient matrices. The values of 
have been empirically determined for the given deployment. These values can 
alternatively be determined as a function of target velocity, environment 















θ =1.  
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2.2.2 Adversary Model 
An adversary can compromise any type A or B sensor node though by design, it is 
harder for an adversary to compromise a type A than a type B. The adversary does not 
have to adhere to protocol. An adversary may be internal i.e., it may be part of the 
sensing network, or external, i.e., it may be an outsider to the sensing network. 
Characteristics of our adversary include:  
Adversary Motivation: To completely disrupt the secure position estimating 
process, motion tracking process or, to throw the estimate way off track.  
Access: The adversary has access to the wireless sensor network in a way that it can 
eavesdrop on communication occurring within its range, has access to schedules and 
secrets (if any) maintained on a compromised node. An adversary has knowledge of 
the particle filtering algorithm employed as well as all parameters stored on a 
compromised node.  
Skills and Resources: The adversary may be as skilled as the Type A sensor nodes 
deployed. An insider adversary has access to all network resources as well as its own 
additional resources. If an adversary captures a node, its capabilities then include full 
control over resources, data, and secrets of the captured node. In other words, if 
captured, a node can be used as a collaborating adversarial node. 
Tactics: The adversary can be active/passive, can insert, modify, replay, redirect 
messages and assume identities of other nodes (masquerade). It, however, cannot 
fabricate messages that decrypt correctly on behalf of a node that it has not 
compromised. In other words, an adversary cannot circumvent the cryptosystem. 
Though deliberately jamming communication (partially) is possible in any wireless 
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network, we believe mitigating this attack is outside our current scope. Existing work 
using Spread Spectrum [69] or other coding techniques [78] is known to mitigate 
jamming attacks. Also, the presence of watchdogs also is a deterrent to selective 
jamming. We are, however, interested in those tactics of the adversary that result in 
malicious or malformed input being accepted by the system, and proving the robust 
working of our proposed algorithm in the presence of such malicious data.   
We will show later how an adversary can use these tactics to launch various attacks 
on our proposed protocol.  
2.2.3 Protocol Description 
We begin with a setup of randomly distributed type A and type B sensor nodes as 
shown in Figure 1. Sensing cells and leaders have been established using leader 
election algorithms. (We discuss this feature in detail in Section 2.3.1) Each sensing 
cell has a single type A leader. Leaders of adjacent sensing cells can communicate 




Figure 1: A typical tracking scenario with Moving leader hand-off. 
When a target comes into sensing range of one of the sensing cells, two things 
happen: the leader of the sensing cell broadcasts an alert signal to all neighboring 
leaders and, a small subset of the type B sensor nodes take measurements ikx  at time 
k, where i is the ith sensor and send it to the type A leader of their cell. (If the sensor 
scheme additionally employs energy conservation schemes like sleep scheduling 
[58][26], then the leader sends an awake signal to its sensing cell members one step 
ahead of time. This is a knee-jerk action, i.e., when a leader node receives an alert 
signal from its neighboring leader node, it automatically issues a wake-up signal to its 
sensing cell members.) The leader node has the apriori belief state from previous 
measurements till time  i.e., 1k −
Target 
Sensing Cell Range 
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( )1: 1|k kp x z −  which is an estimate of the previous 
position of the target (at time 1k − ).  
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Using the new measurements received from the type B nodes, and the prior belief 
state , the leader computes the maximum likelihood of the target’s 
location. This estimate is computed using a particle filter and Sequential Monte Carlo 
(SMC) approximation, where the measurements
( )
i
1: 1|k kp x z −
kx are the particle filter inputs. Based 
on this estimate, the leader chooses the next leader for data aggregation and sends its 
estimate to the next leader. This estimate now becomes the prior belief state of the 
next leader. The process repeats until the target leaves the sensing field. This 
repetition gives us a contiguous estimate of the target’s path i.e., its trajectory. For 
example, in Figure 1 above, the target (shown by a red oval) enters the sensing field 
near A1’s cell. As soon as the target enters A1’s sensing cell range, A1 sends an alert 
signal to all neighboring leaders (A2 and A3 in our case).  At the same time the type B 
sensor nodes in A1’s cell take and send measurements pertaining to the observed 
target to A1. As soon as A2 and A3 receive an alert signal, they alert/awake their type 
B sensor nodes and these cells are ready for measurement. Since A1 is the first node in 
the sensing field to compute this target’s location, it does not posses an apriori belief 
state. Therefore, it randomly draws the initial apriori belief state from the sample 
space. A1 now computes an estimate for the target’s position using measurements it 
received from the type B nodes in its cluster and the initial apriori estimate. A1 
computes the target’s position for each time window that measurements come in. It 
makes the estimate available to the neighbor in the estimated direction, namely to A3 
in our example. As the target moves into the cell of A3’s leadership, A3 repeats the 
process above. This process continues with handoffs of the prior estimate to 
 21
 
subsequent leaders (A1  A3  A4  A6 in our case) until the target moves out of 
range of the sensing field.  
2.2.4 Protocol Specification 
2.2.4.1 Notations and Definitions: 
1. We define all participating principals based on the two types of sensor nodes 
A and B as set  where P is the set of all sensor nodes deployed in the 
field belonging to the same organization. Further, Let X be the target 
traversing the deployment field. 
PBA ∈,
2. We denote a sensing cell by index i and the leader of that sensing cell as . 
Similarly, all type B sensor nodes in a sensing cell i are denoted as where i 
denotes the cell affiliation and j denotes the individual type B sensor node. 
iA
ijB
3. , denotes a message M sent from principal Ai  to principal Bij , in 
sensing cell i and reads “Leader node A sent message M to Bj,  
MBA iji :→
4. n is the number of leader cells A and mi is the number of type B sensor nodes 
in the ith sensing cell. mi’s can be different for different cells, but for 
simplicity we assume all cells to have the same number of type B nodes.  
5. * is used as the short hand for all in the nodes related to the position that the 
symbol appears in. For example, Bi* stands for all type B nodes in sensing cell 
i. Similarly, A* stands for all leader nodes Ai for i=1 to n. 
6. PKAi  is the public key of Ai 
7. TTP is the trusted third party that generates verifiable ID-binding key pairs for 
the leader nodes, PKi and SKi are the public and private keys generated by the 
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TTP’s key generator PKGen. sigTTP is the signature of the TTP. Every node 
recognizes this signature. 
8. <p.f.i>j is the particle filter input from each reporting node j. For simplicity, 
we omit the notation i when we are talking of a single cell. An apriori estimate 
from a leader node adjacent to Ai is denoted by <p.e>i-1. 
9. is the SMC particle filtering function that returns the final output after 
performing the three internal operations (Initialization, importance and 
resampling), ,
Γ
2ε ξ  and are the minimum location estimation error in a 
benign environment, location estimation error observed and maximum 
tolerable estimation error respectively. They are further elaborated upon and 
quantified in the next section. 
2
maxξ
10. θ  is the time interval of observations considered in this round (measurement 
window). 
11. A simple Verifiable ID-binding Key generation is used by a Trusted Third 
Party to generate public-private key pairs for all Type A nodes. Type B nodes 
are installed with the public keys of those type A nodes whose range they will 
fall approximately within during deployment. Type A nodes are only installed 
with their respective secret keys, and the public keys of other type A nodes.  
Key Generation Method: 
( )












2.2.4.2 Specification   
 
Phase 1: Aggregation and Position Estimation Phase at Ai 
 For every type B sensor that senses an active target in cell i: 
(1)  ( )* : : . . , , , ,{ . . , , , } ij ii i j k ij i j k ij i B AB A p f i t B A p f i t B A SK PK→ < > < >M  
 
(2)   :iA j∀ . . jcheck p f i< >  such that AND  
2
max
2 ξξε ≤≤ ( )  is trueMV
        If true, 
1




A p f i θ
=
< > =Γ  
(3) Process repeats from (1) for next time interval θ  
 
Phase 2: Hand off Phase at A 
(1)  { }*: , , Target_Location ii i k i AA A t SKθ→  
(2)  : If 1+iA { }, , Target_Location ii k AiA t Sθ K is true, 
( 1) 1. Target_Locationi ip e θ+ −< > =  
 
Verification Function   ( )MV
Input: Message  M
If [ ] ( )( )ˆ ˆ, & TS & (sig_val) & 2 _l up p N N flagν ν ν∈ − + =M 0  
Output (1);  (Message verification PASS) 
Else  Output (0); (Message verification FAIL) 
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Verification function ( )MV  is used by aggregators to verify whether the 
frequency of incoming messages is within allowable limits, a message is fresh, 
whether it has a valid signature, etc. It outputs true or false based on the result of 
verification process. The following is verified using this function: 
a. The frequency of input is bounded within [ ]ˆ ˆ,lp p uν ν− +  where is 
the baseline frequency, and 
p̂
and l uν ν are the allowable lower and 
upper deviations in frequency.   
b. Timestamp is fresh 
c. Signature verification (sender, recipient, integrity of <p.f.i>) 
d. No anomaly reported by neighboring nodes in cell. (For details see 
lemma 1 and 2  in Section 2.3.4)  
 
2.3 Salient Features of our Robust Target Localization 
Scheme 
The following features of our protocol help make it robust against falsified data, 
secure against various attacks, scalable, achieve consensus regarding measurements, 
and detect inconsistencies in neighborhoods.  
2.3.1 Hierarchical Capability-based Heterogeneous network 
This design feature helps improve mission life, promotes optimal power 
management and makes for a cost effective design. 
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In any deployed sensor network, power and bandwidth are of prime concern. 
Inefficient algorithms and inefficient allocation of roles to participating entities can 
lead to exhaustion, starvation and early termination of the life of a deployed network. 
Processing power, capabilities and life of a sensor node are directly related to its cost. 
In order to be cost-effective, we need to have an intelligent mix of the use of 
relatively inexpensive, less sophisticated workhorse type sensor nodes and the more 
expensive mini-computer type sensor nodes. We, therefore, segregated tasks in the 
deployed sensor network on the basis of function and invest in hardware accordingly. 
We chose to deploy a heterogeneous network comprising of two types of sensor 




Figure 2: A Typical Sensing Cell in two configurations 
 
Type A sensor nodes are long range, low power, high battery life sensor nodes that 
are used for data aggregation, capable of transmitting long distances, and performing 
memory intensive operations. Computation costs, memory usage and storage are 
normally not a concern to these types of nodes. Type B nodes have a substantially 
shorter range of operation, and have lesser resources. These nodes are mainly used 
only as 1-hop sensing and relay elements. Their task is to simply sense and transmit 
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the information locally over relatively short distances. Here, we introduce the notion 
of a sensing cell (Figure 2) which is the region of administration of a single leader. 
The entire sensing field can be comprised of multiple sensing cells. Every type A 
sensor tries to establish a sensing cell, which is the area of its leadership. We also 
refer to a sensing cell as a cluster. Within a single sensing cell, there is only one type 
A leader and multiple type B sensor nodes. Since sensor deployment in certain areas 
and applications is random, there may exist multiple type A sensor nodes in a single 
sensing cell. In such cases, they resolve the contention and elect a single leader for 
the cell. The choice of election algorithms for this distributed system is purely an 
implementation choice. There are many traditional leader election algorithms in 
distributed systems [7]; any algorithm that can be implemented over these sensor 
nodes is acceptable. Since this is not hard to achieve in practice, we assume that 
leader election is completed without conflict. It is worth noting here that 
establishment of a sensing cell is crucial to this scheme, yet no assumption is made 
about the integrity of the leader who is elected, and no pre-installed secrets are 
required to complete this phase. Since we believe that position estimation algorithms 
should precede routing and authentication algorithms so that the latter can use 
position-related information to their advantage, we do not assume any routing 
capabilities in the network. As a result, only those sensor measurements are received 
at the leader that are within one-hop range from the leader node. 
2.3.2 Distributed Aggregation and Moving Leader Design 
This design feature helps improve fault tolerance, optimizes energy and bandwidth 
consumption, reduces chances of battery depletion attacks, and improves real time 
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estimation by reducing unnecessary processing delays in the network. Most 
applications including tracking and sensing applications require data from multiple 
sources to be cooperatively aggregated together. In centralized approaches, as shown 
in Figure 3, all sensed data is relayed to a central base station for aggregation. This 
results in a lot of communication from the sensing locality to the locality of the base 
station. The nodes closer to the base station end up simply becoming relays for the 
rest of the network and quickly get exhausted and die. If the motion of the target is in 
a direction away from the base station, the situation becomes worse. From a security 
standpoint, relaying measurements from the sensing node to the base station through 
multiple hops opens up multiple points for intermediary nodes to corrupt data. Battery 
exhaustion is another valid attack adversarial nodes can launch upon nodes closer to 
the base station. If successful, it can result in the base station getting cut off from the 
rest of the network. Elaborate schemes for routing and path integrity maintenance will 
be required to mitigate these problems.  For these  
 
 
Figure 3: Moving Leader Approach 
reasons, we discard the use of centralized processing schemes and adapt a distributed 
approach. The distributed aggregation approach provides intrusion tolerance to the 
protocol by moving the aggregation function as close to where the information is 
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gathered as possible. This also helps minimize delays in computing the aggregate 
from the time the measurements are taken.  
As the target moves through the sensing field and further away from the initial 
aggregator node, once again the sensor nodes start relaying information from the new 
locality of the target to the old locality where the aggregator resides. A lot of useful 
bandwidth is again wasted in this relaying process. It has been shown through 
experimentation that each bit transmitted consumes as much power as 800-1000 
instructions executed [13] and hence is not an insignificant measure that can be 
overlooked. From a security perspective too, computing the aggregate at a single 
location becomes a single-point of failure if the only aggregating node fails, is 
compromised or the nodes closest to it are deliberately exhausted.   
Therefore, the single aggregator is a high profile target for any attacker, and must 
be made fault tolerant. We adopt a moving leader approach, as shown in Figure 3 
where the aggregating node is always moved to be within the sensing locality of the 
target. This is done by executing the aggregation function at the leader of the cluster 
in which the target is present at a given time. The leader performs the aggregation and 
hands off the target position it has estimated to the next leader in the predicted 
direction of the target’s motion. Due to the hierarchical cluster arrangement of nodes 
in our protocol, the moving leader approach can be effortlessly implemented without 
any additional overhead. Clusters and their leaders have already been established, 
type B sensor nodes have been configured to send their measurements to their 
respective leaders. Therefore, the only change we need to make is that a leader has to 
send its position estimate to another leader. Since the particle filtering algorithm that 
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does the aggregation has an apriori estimate component, this hand off becomes very 
useful. By incorporating a moving leader, we combine the goodness of data 
aggregation in the sensing locality with processing it within the sensing locality itself 
to provide intrusion tolerance, reduce delay and decrease load on sensor nodes.  
2.3.3 SMC Method for Data Aggregation 
This design feature helps improve real-time online target position estimation, 
accurate positioning and trajectory tracing. It also provides for low storage, 
communication, and computational costs as compact representation allows the storage 
and exchange of very little data without diminishing accuracy.  
At the core of our protocol lies an algorithm that belongs to the class of sequential 
Monte Carlo methods (SMC), also known as particle filters because they maintain a 
set of state trajectories (or particles) that are candid representations of the system 
state. They have been information theoretically proven to be good filters for 
dynamical systems. We use one such particle filter to process input parameters 
otherwise known as particles obtained from multiple affiliated sources and aggregate 
them in a Bayesian manner that preserves previous information as well as incorporate 
the current to provide a trajectory of the target.   
The first component of the particle filtering algorithm <p.f.i>j is the particle filter 
input from each reporting node j. For simplicity, we omit the notation i when we are 
talking of a single cell. An apriori estimate from a leader node adjacent to Ai is 
denoted by <p.e>i-1. The second component is Γ the SMC particle filtering function 
that returns the final output after performing the three internal operations 
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(Initialization, importance and resampling).  We describe these internal operations 
further in this sub section.   
Sequential learning and inference methods are important in many applications 
involving real-time signal processing, where data arrival is inherently sequential. In 
our application, furthermore, due to the possible motion of the target, a sequential 
processing approach would be necessary to deal with non-stationary signals. This 
way, information from the recent past is given greater weightage than information 
from the distant past. From a logic perspective this makes more sense in our 
environment, as the last known location of a target is of more value than its previous 
locations for the purpose of computing its next possible location. To perform this type 
of computation using other conventional collaborative processing techniques would 
imply the storage and exchange of large amounts of state information, which defeats 
the purpose of using the distributed architecture and moving leader approach to keep 
communication overhead at a minimum. The particle filter also has a very compact 
representation, and very little data has to be comparatively exchanged to derive a true 
estimate of the target’s position without diminishing accuracy. Thus computational 
simplicity in the form of not having to store all the data also constitutes an additional 
motivating factor for applying sequential methods.  
Monte Carlo methods are very flexible in that they do not require any assumptions 
about the probability distributions of the data. Moreover, experimental evidence 
suggests that these methods lead to improved results [76]. From a Bayesian 
perspective, Sequential Monte Carlo methods allow one to compute the posterior 
probability distributions of interest on-line. Yet, the methods can also be applied 
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within a maximum likelihood context. Though there are various implementations of 
particle filters, we describe the common approach and the generic steps involved: 
Multiple copies (particles) of the variable of interest are used, each one associated 
with a weight that signifies the quality of that specific particle. An estimate of the 
variable of interest is obtained by the weighted sum of all particles. The particle filter 
algorithm is recursive in nature and operates in two phases: prediction and update. 
After each action, each particle is modified according to the existing model 
(prediction stage), including the addition of random noise in order to simulate the 
effect of noise on the variable of interest. This step is also called the Importance 
Sampling Step. Then, each particle’s weight is re-evaluated based on the latest 
sensory information available (update stage). At times the particles with 
(infinitesimally) small weights are eliminated. This process is called resampling.  
 
Step I: Initialization Step/ Sample Step (S): 






 i.e., for m = 1….M are initialized 
by drawing samples from the initial distribution: ( )1| mk k kp x x x −=  for every time 
instant k. 1
m
kx − denotes the previous observation. Every importance weight is initialized 
to ( )0 1
mw M= . 
 
Step II: Importance Step (I): 
In this step, we draw from an importance density function ( )( )1 1:| ,mk k kx x zπ −  and create 
a trajectory proposal as shown below: 
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Particle weights can be recursively computed as: 
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Step III: Resampling Step (R): 
Since weights degrade, we resample so that trajectories with smaller weights can be 
neglected and those with higher weights can become more prominent. For a 
comprehensive understanding of SMC methods, additional resources are available at 
[54] [30]. 
 
In summary, we use the available indirect measurements (also called observations) 
from time 1 through k ( ) and the most recent estimate of position (1:kz 1kx − ) to 
compute the maximum likelihood of the next location using Bayesian inference.  
 
2.3.4 Watchdogs: Additional Data Sources 
This design feature helps disambiguate potential confusions, identify possibly 
malicious or malfunctioning nodes in a neighborhood, provides upper bounds on 
distance estimates without increasing the complexity of the protocol.  
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Here, we leverage the inherent property of a distributed wireless sensor network 
that all communication is seemingly open, spatially and temporally correlated and 
that both the observance and absence of data is a rich source of information. . We 
design watchdogs that observe and make inferences based on (1) communication 
between nodes and (2) the presence and absence of data. Watchdogs are uniformly 
distributed across the deployment network.  
Node-to-Node (N2N) data Watchdogs: One of the advantages of having a 
distributed estimation system is that there is a lot of data around us that we can use to 
make our current estimates better and smarter. For example, due to the nature of the 
communicating medium, when sensor nodes within the same cell send messages to 
the leader, they can hear each other’s messages as well. This is a very important 
source of information, which can be used to identify potentially misbehaving nodes. 
For example, if a node is sending data inconsistently with respect to its neighbors 
(e.g., when there is no target sighted), the neighbors will be able to observe this 
inconsistency and report it to the leader. An important effect of this observation is 
that if a malicious node increases the frequency of sending false data (which is 
acceptable to the system till some extent), the watchdog nodes can observe and report 
this fact to the leader. This can prevent potentially large amounts of false data to be 







Figure 4: Disambiguation using Node-to-Node data. 
 
Another example would be the alteration of the signal strength by the transmitting 
target or the adversary. If any entity changed its transmitting signal strength, it would 
seem to be closer or farther away from its neighbors than it actually is. If its 
neighbors form a closed polygon, as shown in Figure 4, the entity cannot appear to be 
closer to ALL or farther away from ALL its neighbors at the same time. If it appears 
closer than it is to a few neighbors, it must appear farther than it is to other neighbors 
and vice-versa. When neighbors relay information regarding this entity to the leader, 
they can hear each other’s messages, detect any inconsistency and notify the leader. If 
the leader receives sufficient number of inconsistency reports for a node, it can 
choose to ignore the inputs received from the inconsistent node. 
We formulate and prove succinctly how node to node data can be used to detect 
anomalies in node behavior and discard malformed input coming from such nodes 
using lemmas 1 and 2.  
Lemma 1:  In a given neighborhood Ni , repeated observations from any node q that 
deviate from the observations of a simple majority of q’s neighbors  in the same 
interval for the same target, indicate Byzantine behavior, malicious behavior, or play 
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of contrasting environmental characteristic and such observations should not be 
included in aggregated estimates.  
Proof: In a benign environment, there is bound to be some deviation in measurement 
among nodes within a locality due to contrasting environmental factors like uneven 
terrain, shadows, presence of signal attenuators like trees nearer to some nodes than 
others, etc. Once measured and accounted for, this becomes the base line deviation 
for the deployment. Beyond this deviation, any observed deviation must be due to 
malfunction or due to node behavior under malicious influence. Repeated behavior 
can cause a deviant node to be reported and subsequently ignored. We call this 
threshold the observation threshold, crossing which results in a node being reported. 
It can be set depending upon the expected capabilities of adversaries and the baseline 
deviation. Existing vote based algorithms can be incorporated here to avoid innocent 
nodes being reported and ignored. However, it is not necessary to do so as long as 
larger-than-majority collusion does not occur within the neighborhood. If a node is 
reported for any reason including possible environmental factors by a number of 
watchdogs, it is best to ignore the inputs coming from this node as these inputs will 
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Non-observed data Watchdogs: This data comes, actually, from no data. In other 
words, just as the observance of data indicates something, in location determination 
and disambiguation, the non-observance of data is equally informative. For example, 
as shown in figure 5, if node p can hear node q, it would indicate that node q is within 
a radius of R of node p, R being the communication range of the nodes. Similarly, if 
node p does not hear node q, but knows that one of its neighbors s (who is within R of 
p) can hear node q, it would indicate to p that node q is within [R, 2R] of it. Similar 
information from few other nodes would help place node q or any other target more 
accurately. 
Lemma 2:  If R denotes node communication range, and p q and s are three nodes 
deployed in the field under consideration, and p qd d− being the absolute distance 
between p and q then the following statements are true: 
a) If p hears q, they must be at most R apart, i.e., p qd d R− ≤  
b) If s hears both p and q, they must be at most 2R apart i.e., 2p qd d R− ≤  
c) If p hears s, p does not hear q, but s hears q, then q must lie within ( ], 2R R  of 
p. i.e., 2p qR d d R< − ≤  
Proof a): We refer to figure 5 to prove this intuitive lemma. If the communication 
range of each node is R, then by virtue of this argument, any honest node that p can 
hear, must be within the range R. Therefore, 
                 q.e.dp qd d R− ≤  (1.1) 
 
Proof b): We use Lemma 2 a) to help us here. We start with Eq. (1.1) 
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  p sd d R− ≤  (1.2) 
  s qd d R− ≤  (1.3) 
 
Adding (1.2) and (1.3) we get 
p s s qd d d d R R− + − ≤ +  
 2p qd d R⇒ − ≤  (1.4) 
 
Proof c): p hears s, p does not hear q, but s hears p can be rephrased as s hears both 
p and q, but p does not hear q (and vice versa is assumed).  
From Lemma 2 a) we have 
 p sd d R− ≤ , and  s qd d R− ≤  
From  p sd d R− ≤  we have 
 p q s q
p q s q
p q
d d d d R
d d d d
d d R R
− − + ≤
⇒ − − − ≤
⇒ − − ≤
R  
 2p qd d R⇒ − ≤  (1.5) 
 
And from p does not hear q, we have  
 p qd d R− >  (1.6) 
 Combining results (1.5) and (1.6), we have the mixed interval 
 




In summary, by using the observance and non observance of data from certain nodes, 
we can put an upper bound (and in some cases a lower bound too) on the distance 
estimates to a particular node, with negligible overhead. In the case of localizing a 
target, this information can be very useful to quickly bound a target to an upper and 
lower limit and then fine tune the estimate. These bounds also serve to disambiguate 
and reject impractical values quickly and easily without incurring much additional 
overhead. One important point to note is the distribution and density of watchdogs. If 
they are not uniformly distributed, then an adversary can take advantage of 
neighborhoods where watchdog nodes are sparse. If they are either too large or too 
small in number, they will not be very effective. A very large number of watchdogs is 
counterproductive since these nodes will add to the cost. On the other hand, having 
less number of watchdogs will fall short of serving the purpose. We leave this study 





Chapter 3 Analysis of Robust Target Localization  
 In this chapter, we analyze the resistance of our protocol against false data attacks 
from a robustness perspective. In other words, we examine how the protocol reacts to 
malicious behavior that is not detectable, i.e., that which has been crafted to look like 
noise, systemic variation, or environmental influence or cleverly crafted fraudulent 
data sand not specifically adversarial behavior. We quantify the maximum adversarial 
behavior the system can tolerate, and derive an expression for the least upper bound 
expected error under such circumstances. We then cast this as a multivariate 
optimization problem and solve it for the degree of robustness achieved by the 
protocol. We derive a lower bound on the number of particles that must be active in 
the particle filter in order to ensure that the solution is always δ-robust. Additionally, 
we examine the dependencies associated with this solution and their effects on the 
outcome. We then examine the various security properties of the system and showed 
that they are not violated in any run (malicious or non malicious) of the protocol.  
WSNs are data centric networks, the prime objective being collection and 
processing of data say, for example, for strategic or military decision making. An 
intelligent adversary need not attempt sophisticated attacks to dislodge the network. It 
can intelligently craft bogus data acceptable to the system and negatively influence 
the outcome of the system or protocol. This in turn will negatively influence strategic 
decisions themselves. When data itself is falsified, strong cryptographic protocols 
cannot provide any resilience. Integrity check mechanisms will also fail because they 
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only check for in-transit message corruption. They cannot prevent against falsified 
data in a legitimately created perfectly valid message. Source authentication also does 
not help as corrupt insider sources will be able to authenticate themselves 
successfully. Broadly, there are only two ways to resist the objective of such false 
data attacks. One is to be able to detect that the data is false and discard it, or second, 
to be robust against false data. In practice, it is hard to design perfectly robust 
protocols. We evaluate our protocol under worst case attack and show that it achieves 
δ-degree of robustness. 
Recall our notion that the objective of an attack on a data centric network is to 
cause the network to either report incorrect or no data, or in the case of intelligence 
(inferential) operations, arrive at an incorrect or inconclusive outcome. In the case of 
the WSN under our consideration, an attacker’s objective could be to adversely 
influence the resulting target estimate or result in no estimate of the target’s position 
at all. This can be achieved through a variety of ways, directly or indirectly.  We 
attempt to briefly classify these attacks. We refer to attacks like signal degradation, 
deliberately jamming a node’s signal or withholding a measurement as physical 
attacks and attacks on the protocol like spoofing a leader’s or aggregator’s identity, 
lying about other nodes, misrepresenting one’s location, falsely accusing honest 
nodes of malicious behavior, replay attacks,  etc as protocol attacks. We refer to a 
third class of attacks as data centric attacks which includes attacks where a node 
sends incorrect belief values to a neighboring aggregator node, incorrect 
measurement values to the aggregator node, adversary increasing the frequency of its 
inputs to drown out the target estimate at the aggregator, or simply skew it towards a 
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false outcome. Different classes of attacks warrant different treatments. While we do 
not consider physical attacks at this time, our protocol is capable, in some situations, 
of identifying if a direct physical attack is under way in some subsections of the 
deployment (using watchdogs, for example).  We perform a security analysis of 
common protocol attacks that our protocol is susceptible too, and a robustness 
analysis to evaluate the effect of data centric attacks.  
Undesirable behavior can be classified into malfunctioning, malicious and 
compromised nodes. They primarily differ in their intent, and hence have different 
detection probabilities in our model. We refer to a node as malfunctioning when the 
node disobeys protocol or supplies arbitrary measurements, without intent to harm the 
outcome or the working of the protocol. Selfish nodes come under this category too 
though they technically are not malfunctioning. We refer to a node as simply being 
malicious if it is not part of the sensing model, and is working with bad intent towards 
deliberately degrading and throwing the estimate off track. Finally, we refer to a node 
as being compromised if it is an authenticated party in the network and working with 
bad intent towards degrading the estimate.  
Few threats and attacks that can cause an incorrect estimation of the target’s 
position are enumerated below. We also discuss how these attacks are currently 
countered by our scheme. 
3.1 Attack Model 
We represent an honest principal by HP_bi, and a dishonest one by DP_bi, such that 
 , is the set of all interacting type B principals in a cluster ( _ _i i
i m





i.  DP_bi, includes all malicious and compromised nodes and HP_bi includes all non 
malicious nodes. If Ci represents the cluster i after a successful run of the cluster 
formation algorithm, then we simply state the following lemma without proof.   
 
Lemma 3:  The precondition to a data centric attack, is satisfied if at the end of a 
successful run of the cluster formation algorithm, _ i iDP b C∈   
  _ ,  and .i BDP b P i n∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
Proof: Initially, all nodes are assumed to be benign. Under this assumption, no 
dishonest node will be part of the protocol, and hence no data centric attacks can be 
launched. This is because our protocol only accepts data from sources that posses 
valid cryptographic keys required to sign message (1) in Phase 1 and message (1) in 
Phase 2 (Refer to protocol specification in Section 2.2.4.2). Therefore, it follows that 
if a dishonest node (malicious or compromised) is able to successfully penetrate the 
cluster formation process, then a necessary precondition to launch a data centric 
attack has been met.  
 
We represent the actions of a malicious node that is a part of the cluster, within a 
single set of adversarial actions Λ. This includes disruptive actions such as non-
forwarding, dropping, modifying data content, replaying, flooding, delay time-
sensitive data packets selectively or inject bogus packets into the particle stream.  
We further define Λd as the subset of actions in Λ which result in an identifiable 
unsuccessful run, i.e., those actions that have effects that hold in the next transition 
state, and which may or may not result in a successful termination of the protocol. . 
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A successful attack action Λ∈a requires that the preconditions of a  hold at the 
start of the attack in say, state s1 and the effects of a hold in a subsequent state s2. 
Sα,is one such precondition. If da ∈ Λ ∈Λ then, the attack can be detected with non-
negligible probability . If 
d
pΛ \ da ∈ Λ Λ then, our protocol should result in a 
successful run with the target location output being within the tolerable MSE range, 
i.e.,  with probability 1222 MAXξξε ≤≤ dpΛ−    
  
Lemma 4:  In a scenario with multiple independent acting adversaries, the number of 
Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated depends upon the detection threshold , and 



















⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦≤
− −
 
Here, clearly, Λ∈a . In the worst case scenario, all dishonest principals DP_bi and 
some percentage of honest principals that are malfunctioning will be part of the 
adversary set. If the fail rate of the devices being employed is γ then, γHP_bi are the 
honest parties that contribute to the adversary set.  
We start with the classic Byzantine two-thirds majority2 result that in order for the 








HP b DP bγ
−
+ ≤  (3.1) 
 
                                                 
2 The Byzantine simple majority result cannot be applied in our case since in order for the simple 
majority result to prevail, there needs to be an infrastructure that allows signed messages from each 
node Bij to prove not just message integrity but also authentication (source authentication)., for 
example like in a public key infrastructure. Since this is not the case in our scheme, we cannot use the 
simple majority result.   
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MAXε ξ ξ≤ ≤  
thereby resulting in the removing out of band data, implies that ibHP _γ can be 




MAXξ , say. Therefore, ( )dpbHP i Λ−1_γ  honest nodes are not detected and eliminated 
from the algorithms computation process. 
Similarly for dishonest principals, we have ( )
d
pbDP i Λ−1_  as the number of 
participating dishonest nodes in a single cluster i. 













which gives us  
( )
( )( )














⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦≤
− −
  (3.2) 
  
Clearly, as the detection probability  increases the right hand side of Eq.(3.2) 
increases showing that the ability of the algorithm to withstand Byzantine behavior 
improves. In other words, we can tolerate more dishonest nodes and as a result 





Figure 6 below shows the effect of varying on the number of dishonest nodes 
tolerated (DP) for different values of 
d
pΛ
γ . (γ is varied from 0.01 to 0.5, =100 nodes, 
















gamma = 0.1          
gamma = 0.2          
gamma = 0.3          
gamma = 0.4          






























Here we observe that as detection ability increases, the system can tolerate 
more number of malicious entities. Detection ability depends on the data 
validation mechanism employed as well on the particle filters ability to track and 
filter mis-data as noise. This directly translates to the particle filter threshold when it 
tracks performance vs. collective disturbances. The threshold can be modulated by 
modifying the time period of observations, reducing the update period, and increasing 
number of particles collected per time window by modulating the sleep awake 
distribution criteria of each cluster. Effects of these characteristics on the threshold 





3.2 Robustness Analysis 
To prove robustness we model the behavior of the protocol, its assumptions and 
dependencies as well as other sources of uncertainty. We then assess if the uncertain 
system satisfies a desirable property P for every admissible value of the uncertainty.  
In our case, we define a robustness parameter δ, which is measured against location 
error as the desired property P. We model the uncertainties and observe their effect on 
the location error for all admissible values of the uncertainties in the constraint space. 
We examine the output for the worst-case malice from adversary within the given 
time window and given neighborhood. At this point, we would like to point out that 
the adversary is limited to the immediate neighborhood.  
Input to tracking system is vector x X∈  
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Vector x is a set of observations from various entities in the neighborhood. 
Therefore, input is a continuous stream of input vectors { }[1], [2],.., [ ]X x x x N= the 
collection of which at t+T (time window) results in the output position estimate Z[t+T].  
If  is within δ of the true position [t TZ + ] ]
*
[t TZ + , then the tracking estimate is useful. 
We say that  is δ-robust if ]  is δ within ]  for all  for worst 
case malicious input. 
[t nTZ + ] t nTZ + t nTZ +[
*





Phase 1: Aggregation and Position Estimation Phase at Ai 
 
 For every type B sensor that senses an active target in cell i: 
 
(1)  ( )* : : . . , , , ,{ . . , , , } ij ii i j k ij i j k ij i B AB A p f i t B A p f i t B A SK PK→ < > < >M  
 
(2)  :iA j∀  . . jcheck p f i< >  such that AND 
2
max
2 ξξε ≤≤ ( )  is trueMV  
 
        If true, 
1




A p f i T et Location θ
=
< > =Γ  
(3) Process repeats from (1) for next time interval θ  
 
 
Phase 2: Hand off Phase at A 
(1)  { }*: , , arg _ ii i k iA A t T et Location SKθ→ A  
 
(2)  : If 1+iA { }, , arg _ ii k AiA t T et Location SKθ is true, 
 
( 1) 1. arg _ip e T et Location θ+ −< > =  
 
Verification Function ( )MV  
Input: Message  M
If [ ] ( )( )ˆ ˆ, & & _l up p TS (sig_val) & N2N flagν ν ν 0∈ − + =M  
Output (1); (Message verification PASS) 
         Else        Output (0); (Message verification FAIL) 
 
Figure 7: Secure and Robust Location Determination Protocol 
 
 
Let us assume adversary can craft malicious input (attack feature) ˆ[ ]x i . If the 
adversary’s rate of sending attack particles is , probability p̂ pα  of setting its attack 
particles at rate [ ]ˆ ˆ,lp p uν ν ν= − +  where lν and uν are the lower and upper bounds on 
the allowable rate of particle inputs without raising suspicion and being detected, and 
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probability pβ  that the attack particles are set within the allowable error range, so as 
to not trigger outlier detection and rejection. 
 
Adversary algorithm ( ),p pα βF  
  Select [ ]ˆ ˆ, ,l up p pα ν ν ν∈ − +  
  Select 2 2max0,  such that ,d xp pβ ξ ε ξΛ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∈ ∈ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
   Select 2 2max,xξ ε ξ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  
  ( )|ˆ . . , xj xx p f c ξ←E  
  Output ( )x̂  
 
 dIf a ∈ Λ ∈ Λ , attack detected with non negligible probability  dpΛ




Adversary outputs ( )ˆ ,x p pα β← F  
 
Definition 3-1: At the end of a successful run, if adversary output ( )ˆ ,x p pα β← F  
produces no more than  δ deviation from the estimate of the true position, then we say 
that the system is δ-robust. 
Let us calculate the effect of a single adversary injecting intelligently crafted 
malicious input to the tracking system at A. If the adversary does not exceed the rate 
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of injection of particles [ ]ˆ ˆ,lp p uν ν ν= − +  then all its inputs { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[1], [2],.., [..]X x x x=  
will be accepted with probability 1
d
pΛ− . 
Therefore, at the end of the three stages, we calculate the derived position estimate 
 as: [ˆ t nTZ + ]






 i.e., for m = 
1….M are initialized by drawing samples from the initial 
distribution:  for every time instant n. ( 1| mn n np x x x −= ) 1mnx −  is the previous 
observation. Every importance weight is initialized to ( )0 1
mw M= . 









with rate ν =[ ]ˆ ˆ,lp p uν ν− + and MSE 
2
maxξ ξ≤ adversary can causes ˆ ˆ.N Tν=  particles within the time window T to be 
accepted by the system. In the worst case scenario, ˆN N= in which case, the output 
will be maximally deviated from the true estimate, and is not of concern to us. On the 
basis of the Byzantine result derived in the earlier sub-section, we can expect the 
worst case as a set of particles drawn with 50% malicious input.  
In the second step, the proposed trajectory becomes 
( ) ( ) (1: 1 1 1: 1 1:
1




),k kx x z x x zπ π π −
=
= ∏  
And finally, after the resampling step, error propagation calculations show that the 
cumulative error in the estimate is as follows. Since we know the uncertainties 
parametrically from when they were introduced, we can estimate the uncertainties 








i i ix z
π ππ
= −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎜ ⎟∆ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑  
At each stage of the algorithm, the approximation admits a mean square error on the 
order of the number of particles.  
Finally estimate  becomes ]  [t nTZ + ] ˆ ˆt nT t nT t nTZ Z Z+ + += + ∆[ ] [ ] [
 
From here, we need to answer two questions. Firstly, what is the effect of this error 
on the output? If the error is not greater than the allowed tolerance δ, then the system 
is δ-robust as per Definition 3-1. Secondly, what is the upper bound on the frequency 
of crafted observations to cause the error to still be 2maxξ ξ≤ and [ ]ˆ t nTZ δ+∆ < , if any? 
 
The probability distributions of the random variables and mean square error for the 
given system are known to converge. We therefore begin with the result that: 
 and again, at each stage of the algorithm, as the approximation 
admits a mean square error on the order of the number of particles, we can calculate 
an upper bound on the approximate mean square error introduced since the number of 
malicious particles is bound by the rate of delivery of the particles as determined by 
the adversary. In a given attempt, in the worst case an adversary can input atmost 
lim ( . )Nt tN a sπ π→∞ =
ˆ.Tν malicious particles provided the input is within the tolerable error limit (to avoid 
being dropped). Thus the bounded error is a function of the input rate, the time 




Lemma 5:  If the probability that particles pass undetected through the Byzantine 
detection and agreement algorithm is pχ , and pβ  is the probability that the attack 








p p p p
χ β
β χ χ χ
Λ = − +
   
 






p p p p
χ β
χ β χ β
Λ = + −
 






p p p p
χ β
β χ χ χ
Λ = − +
  (3.3) 
 
 
We have already defined our condition for robustness assessment in Definition 
3-1. We have also seen briefly that the position estimate as well as the location error 
is dependent upon a few parameters like number of particles, node density, frequency 
of incoming particles, the time window of the filter etc. For now, all these parameters 
are variable in our setup. Solving this problem, therefore, becomes a multivariate 
optimization problem.  
We can solve this problem in a few different ways. Commonly used optimization 
techniques are game theory/ decision theory approach, and parametric optimization 
approach. The parametric approach is better suited to our problem. One way to solve 
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this problem parametrically is by combining all the parameters into a single parameter 
and optimizing the utility function (location error) in our case against it. We begin 
optimization by breaking the problem down into independent components each of 
which can be singularly optimized. The additive property of optimal solutions for 
independent events implies that the summation of these components will provide the 
optimal solution to the problem. 
 
Lemma 6:  Given an initial estimate of location, initial parameters , 
ud
pΛ pΛ and a 
derivable constant , the least upper bound |t tc δ such that the expected error of the 
system is δ –robust is given by  [ ] [ ] [ ]1 1inf ( ) ( )E e p E e p E eδ ′≥ + − 3 which is the 
difference of the MSE with and without the presence of malice. 
Proof: 
We start with the definition of δ . 
By definition, δ  is the deviation in location error observed due to the introduction 
of malice in the tracking system, and is given by 
Expected error Expected error Probability of 
Probability of 
 with maximum  with no malicious  no malicious 
malicious input
malicious input input input
δ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛





i.e.   *1 1(1 )f p f pδ Λ Λ= − −  (3.4) 
 
Where is the expected error with malicious input, given by *1 f
[ ] [ ]*1 .1 2 f  E e  .p+E e p′=  where [ ]1E e  is the expected error with undetectable 
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malicious input, [ ]2E e  is the expected error with detectable malicious input and p is 
the associated probability. We will show shortly that *1f is actually the optimum value 
of the expected error with malicious input.  
Similarly,  is the expected error without malicious input, given by 1 f
[ ]1 1. |3 f  E e p ==  where [ ]3E e  is the expected error without any malicious input, and 
p=1. 
 
Thus, we have  
 [ ] [ ]*1 .(1 )ud ud1 2f  E e  .p +E e pΛ= Λ−  (3.5) 
 
Since is the expected error without malice, it follows that1 f [ ] 21 3 f  E e ε= = , a 
predefined semi-variant constraint which is the baseline error, and may be dictated by 
the sensitivity and requirements of the tracking system application. 
E[e2] being the expected error with detectable malicious input, it is inversely  




CE e C+ c
NN t
ϕ
= ≤  
for any bounded function ϕ  and constants C, and (at time t.) The remaining 
term in  (Eq. (3.5)) i.e. the
|t tc
*
1 f [ ]1E e  term is an optimization problem in itself, where 
we require the minimum [ ]1E e for maximum malice in order for δ -robustness to be 
true. We now try to solve for this value. To get an intuitive idea, we present [ ]1E e  in 
a min max setting: 
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1ˆˆ ˆ[ , ] , , ,
min max i
l u ud
p p p N
p p p p p N
  E eα β χ
α βξ ε ξ ν ν ν Λ
∗
∈ = − + ,F   
Frequencyν , as we have seen before, is already bounded by the system to 
[ ]ˆ ˆ,lp p uν ν ν= − +  which provides the range of error fluctuation. From this relation 
we can see that if the number of non malicious particles is increased, not through the 
rate but through increased number of participants (particle density) we can further 
reduce the impact of the malicious input. Intuitively moving a step further, if the 
particle density is increased in a non uniform manner (skewed towards cliques) the 
same nodes can help multiple clusters and disambiguate mis-data without increasing 
node participation. This is an important result. We can use frequency limitation, 
particle density and number of particles to narrow the constraint space and further 
eliminate solutions of the min max function above that fall outside of this space. This 
gives us a smaller solution space and reduces complexity by an order. 
We will use Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) method 
introduced by [37] to solve for [ ]1E e  where the gradient is approximated using a 
randomized finite difference method. Compared to the standard finite difference 
method, SPSA is advantageous in that we only need to compute 2 estimates of the 
objective function per iteration, irrespective of p- the dimension of θ , instead of 2p 
estimates. Also, under general conditions, SPSA and standard finite difference 
stochastic approximation methods achieve the same level of statistical accuracy for a 
given number of iterations even though SPSA requires 1/p times the measurements. 
SPSA converges to the optimal solution within a given level of accuracy (in our case 
δ) with p times fewer measurements of the objective function and is ideally suited to 
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low computational cost, speed dependent real-time applications where both time and 
accuracy are important, and where all uncertainties and non-linearities cannot be 
accurately modeled.  
The use of the SPSA technique results in an elegant optimization algorithm for 
SMC methods. For simplicity and clarity, we will follow the notations used in 
standard SPSA literature [37][38][39].  
Assume (general assumption) the SMC algorithm is parameterized smoothly by a 
parameter θ ∈Θ where is an open subset of . Under stability assumptions on 
the dynamic model of interest, the particles, their corresponding weights, the true 
state and the observation of the system form a homogenous and ergodic Markov 
chain. Performance measure can thus be defined as the expectation of a cost function 
with respect to the invariant distribution of this Markov chain parameterized by 
Θ mR
θ . 
We now define the time average cost function ( )J θ for our system as the expected 
error with undetectable malicious input E[e1], and represented as: 
( ) ( ) 1, , , [J E f Z X X W Eθθ ⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ]e
)
 
where the expectation is with respect to the invariant distribution of the Markov 
chain ( , , ,Z X X W  corresponding to the set of observations, true and estimated 
states, and estimated weights of the system. We are interested in estimating 
( )arg min Jθ θ∗ =  which will give us the desired minimum value of E[e1]. Here, it is 
worth noting that the cost function is independent of the observations since the 
observation process is being integrated out. One important practical consequence of 
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this is that the SMC algorithm can be alternately optimized off-line by simulating the 
data and then use the resulting optimized algorithm on real data.  
The mean square error represented in the SPSA format is   






n n n n n n k n k
k





We are interested in estimating ( )arg min Jθ θ∗ = .Using SPSA, the problem of 
minimizing a differentiable cost function ( )J θ , where effectively 
translates into finding the zeros of the gradient 
mθ ∈Θ ⊆R
( )J θ∇ . Recursively, we can estimate 
θ ∗ such that  as follows: ( ) 0J θ∇ =
1
ˆ
n n n Jθ θ γ− n= − ∇    (3.7) 
Where is the noise corrupted estimate of gradient ˆ nJ∇ ( )J θ∇  estimated at the point 
1nθ −  and [ ]nγ  denotes a sequence of positive scalars such that 0nγ →  and 









θ ∗ .  
In order to solve (3.7) we need to obtain the gradient estimate . In SPSA the 
gradient approximation is done via finite difference using the estimates of the cost 
function. Briefly, all elements of 
ˆ
nJ∇
1nθ − will be varied randomly simultaneously (hence 
the name simultaneous perturbation) to obtain two estimates of the cost function 
. Only two estimates are required regardless of the dimension ( 1nJ perturbationθ − ± )
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p of the parameter. For a two-sided gradient approximation, the gradient estimate 




ˆ ˆ( ) (ˆ
2
n n n n n n
n i
n n i
J c J cJ
c
θ θ− − )+ ∆ − − ∆∇ =
∆
 
Where  denotes a sequence of positive scalars such that  and 
 is an p-dimensional random perturbation vector. Algorithm 
parameters 
{ }nc 0nc →
( ,1 ,2 ,, ,....,n n n n∆ = ∆ ∆ ∆ )p
, , and n n ncγ ∆  require careful selection to ensure convergence. 









= respectively with non-negative coefficients a, c, A, α and β . 
We find that 0.602α =  and 0.101β =  (recommended values) are practically 
effective in our case too. is a symmetric Bernoulli n∆ 1±  distribution. We set a and c 
low initially (recommended for high noise settings) and our final stable values used 
were a= 0.16,  c= 1, A=100, α = 0.602 and β =0.101 .  
 
We now incorporate the two-sided SPSA optimization algorithm into our SMC 
framework. Recall the steps involved in the filtering algorithm from Section 2.3.3 
 
Step 1: Sequential importance sampling with SPSA 
For n=1 to N, sample ( ), 1 1, , ,n k n n k nX q X Zθ − − •∼  is the perturbed observation function.  
We then compute the normalized importance weights with perturbation as  
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We now evaluate the cost function.  
First, we generate an p-dimensional simultaneous perturbation vector and compute n∆
1 1( ) and (n n n n n nc cθ θ− −− ∆ + ∆  
For k=1 to N, sample . ( ), 1 1, , ,n k n n n n k nX q c X Zθ+ − −+ ∆ •∼  
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Again, for k=1 to N, sample . ( ), 1 1, , ,n k n n n n k nX q c X Zθ− − −− ∆ •∼  
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We evaluate the cost function 1 1( ) and ( )n n n n n nJ c J cθ θ− −+ ∆ − ∆ from 
{ } { }, ,X W and X W+ + − − respectively. 
Step 3: Gradient approximation 




ˆ ˆ( ) (ˆ
2
n n n n n n
n i
n n i
J c J cJ
c
θ θ− −+ ∆ − − ∆∇ =
∆
)  
Step 4: Parameter update 




Step 5: Sampling 
Multiply (Discard) particles nX with respect to high/low importance weights to 




It is possible to improve the algorithm in many ways, for example, by using 
common random number or other numerical approximates like iterates averaging to 
reduce the variance of the gradient estimate. The idea behind it being to introduce 
strong correlation between our estimates of  1 1( ) and ( )n n n n n nJ c J cθ θ− −− ∆ + ∆ so as to 
reduce the variance. For further details and improvements upon SPSA we refer the 
reader to [39]. 
 
 
Figure 8 Sequence of average MSE estimates over time 
 
The results obtained for this simulation are plotted above in Figure 8. for a= 0.16,  
c= 1, A=100, α = 0.602 , β =0.101  and for N = 100. Clearly, one can see that the 
MSE with maximum undetectable malicious input almost mimics the response of the 
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original system, that is, there is no non-linear loss observed. Further, the difference in 
the error is almost constant, except for a few minor exceptions. If we set this finite 
difference in the error as r.δ where r is a safety factor 0.4 0.8r< < , then the system is 
guaranteed to be δ-robust as long as all the uncertainties modeled above do not violate 
their physical constraints. 
 
We now try to answer the second question we asked earlier, what is the upper 
bound on the frequency of crafted observations to cause the error to still 
be 2maxξ ξ≤ and [ ]ˆ t nTZ δ+∆ < , if any? This answer can be analytically derived. We 
formulate and prove it as a lemma thus: 
 
Lemma 7: For a given filter with known mean and variances for the importance 
function generating samples, the supremum value of frequency of crafted 
observations that can limit the maximum error in the approximation to under 2maxξ and 
[ ]
ˆ
t nTZ δ+∆ <  is given by min[ , ]threshold uν ν ν+  where ISthreshold
N N
T
ν −≤ and  is the 
number of samples coming from the importance function. 
ISN
 
Proof: We make use of KL distance sampling (Kullback-Leibler distance)[18] 
method from statistical theory that can be used to adaptively estimate the number of 
particles to represent the target posterior distribution without increasing the overhead 
to the normal operation of the filter.  
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KL distance sampling is used to adaptively estimate the number of samples needed 
to put an upper bound on the error of the particle filter. The error is measured by the 
KL distance between the true posterior distribution and the empirical distribution, 
which is a well known nonparametric maximum likelihood estimate. It is a standard 
measure of the difference between two probability distributions. It can never be 
negative, but a zero value is indicative of identical distributions. 
The likelihood ratio converges to a chi-square distribution, and the bound for the 






N δε − −
> x    (3.8) 
where KLε is the upper bound for the error given by the KL distance, and 1 δ− is the 
quartile of the  distribution with k-1 degrees of freedom. Equation 3.7 can be 
further expanded using the Wilson Hilferty transformation [24] but for our proof 
purpose, the form of equation 3.7 above will suffice.  
2x
A slight drawback of using KL distance sampling is the underlying assumption that 
the samples always come from a true distribution which we assume to be free of 
malicious input. Recall that our particle filter samples are drawn from an importance 
function π . In an adversarial scenario, some of these samples can be corrupt and 
misleading. Therefore, in statistical terms, the quality of the match (or rather, 
mismatch) between this function and the true distribution determines the accuracy of 
the filter in the presence of malicious samples, and in turn, the suitable number of 
particles required to uphold the correct estimates. The bound given by KL distance 
 63
 
sampling only uses information about the complexity of the true posterior, but it 
ignores any mismatch between the true and the proposal distribution. 
KL distance sampling, thus, does not provide the answer to our question directly, 
but provides an excellent start. We now need to quantify the degradation in the 
estimation using samples from the importance function instead of a uniform empirical 
distribution. This will give us the bounds we are interested in. We are interested in 
accurately finding an equivalent number of samples from the (possibly flawed) 
importance density function as that from the true density function that captures the 
same amount of information. Relative numerical efficiency (RNE) helps us derive 
such an accurate bound and adjust the KL distance sampling estimate by relating the 
two samples.  
RNE in the context of Monte Carlo (MC) integration, introduced by Geweke [33], 
provides an index to quantify the influence of sampling from an importance function. 
RNE allows us to compare the relative accuracy of solving an integral using samples 
coming from both the true and the proposal density. This gives us the effect of 
sampling from an importance function as opposed to a true distribution. We follow 
the approach of [5] to equate the variance of the estimator estimated using KL 
distance sampling and RNE as follows:   
Using Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) integration to estimate the mean value of the 






ρ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦   (3.9)  
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where N is the number of samples coming from the true distribution ( )xρ with no 
malicious input samples.  
When the samples come from an importance function π , the variance of the 
estimator actually corresponds to the variance of Importance Sampling (IS). This is 
given by [33] : 






E x E x w x
Var E x
N N
π σ−⎡ ⎤ = =⎣ ⎦  (3.10) 
where is the number of samples coming from the importance function 
containing both malicious and non malicious input samples, and w is the associated 
weight attached to the incoming particles.  
ISN
Equating the variance of both estimators allows us to achieve similar levels of 
accuracy. This in turn allows us to find a relation that quantifies the equivalence 
between samples from the true and the proposal density. Equating both variances (i.e., 







=    (3.11)  
Replacing (3.11) in (3.8) allows us to obtain the correct bound given by KL 
distance sampling when the samples do not come from the true distribution but from 













> x    (3.12) 
( )Var xρ and 
2
ISσ can be estimated in the standard manner as: 
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Note from the above equation that the order of complexity of the filter is always 
maintained at O(N) making this a low complexity and lightweight approximation 
inline with our theme. 
Equation (3.12) gives us the bound for the number of particles that can keep the 
error under bound 2maxξ (as a function of quartile values). As long as NIS is greater than 
the right hand side of equation (3.12), maximum error 2maxξ will be bound by the 
quartile value 1 δ− . Further, the minimum number of particles that can limit the 
maximum allowable error in the approximation will be 
minIS
N 1ISN + .  
Since the total number of incoming particles in a time window T is .Tν , it further 
implies that the above result holds as long as the total number of malicious particles 







ν −≤  reduces the allowable range ofν to  [ , min[ , ]]l threshold uν ν ν ν ν− +  
q.e.d 
 
3.3 Security Properties of our Scheme 
 
To build a secure protocol, we must understand what it means to be secure. Security 
means different things to different people. Therefore, we first define what we 
consider are security properties for our protocol. Security properties essentially are 
characteristics that applications, protocols or programs must satisfy in order to be 
valid for all reasonable and unreasonable inputs. The violation of a security property 
for any input implies a vulnerability. Conscious application of this input by someone 
possessing this knowledge constitutes a legitimate attack on the system.  
In this section, we will specify various security properties of the protocol, ascertain 
that they are preserved in the face of an attack and understand boundary conditions 
and dependencies that exist, if any, for each of the security properties under 
consideration.   
 
For any protocol or system under design, security properties fall under the 
following broad categories: freshness, authenticity, secrecy, non-intrusion and 
resilience.  
1. Freshness: freshness means that messages sent and received in a session are 
generated and used in the same session. An attacker cannot use messages from 
previous (or future) sessions in the current session without being detected.  
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Our target tracking protocol takes, as input, individual measurements coming 
from various nodes in the present neighborhood of the target, assimilates them 
and produces a Bayesian likelihood type estimate of the current target 
position. Targets may be moving. From this it is obvious that measurements 
must be time sensitive. Only measurements that are close to each other in time 
can be aggregated in the same iteration. The duration for which measurements 
are considered to be part of the same iteration is known as the time window. 
Only measurements received during the same time window can be used to 
estimate target location corresponding to that time window. For online 
processing, measurements are generated and aggregated closely in time 
whereas for offline or passive processing, measurements still need to be 
aggregated per window, but there may be a gap between the time 
measurements are taken and when they are aggregated. In this work, we 
consider the former case. The latter case is only a slight modification of the 
former and can be easily derived from the former.  
Therefore, the freshness security property for our protocol states that a 
message containing a measurement regarding a target should only be 
acceptable if it is valid in the current time window. Since we assume that the 
nodes of the distributed system are loosely synchronized over single hop, the 
freshness property results in that time stamps associated with measurement 
messages should not be alterable without detection i.e., the time stamp must 
be integrity protected along with the rest of the message during transit. 
Messages should not be recorded and replayed later in a manner that is 
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undetectable. Also within a time window messages need not be ordered since 
their ordering within the window is not relevant to the estimator. The size of 
the window of validity is tightly coupled with the synchronization degree (or 
rather tolerable synchronization error σ). If the window is smaller, the nodes 
need to synchronize more often, and more tightly (smaller allowable σ). If the 
window is larger, the nodes can synchronize less often and may have slightly 
larger values of tolerable synchronization error σ. This indirectly influences 
cost as well as storage since longer time windows result in larger storage 
requirement. We leave this as a future study goal.  
2. Message Authenticity: Measurement messages should not be altered or 
corrupted in transit in a manner that is undetectable. Altered and corrupt 
messages should not be included in computing the target location estimate. 
Further, messages that come from sources that possess valid authentication 
material (like shared secrets) are accepted for use in computing the target 
location estimate. Non repudiation is not required. Note that based on this 
definition, select replays (fairly recent ones) of authentic messages are 
accepted by the system. 
3. Uniqueness: Each node can take only one measurement at a given time 
instant.  Alternatively, no node can have two or more measurements for the 
same time instant. Note that there is an implied assumption here. Since 
transactions are assumed atomic, no node can legitimately generate two 
messages for the same time instant.  
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4. Secrecy: In an honest scenario, contents of a message are kept secret between 
the intended participants of the protocol only i.e., they cannot be read by 
nodes other than the creator or the intended recipients. (A trusted third party, 
if existing, is regarded as the creator, and does not violate the secrecy 
property.)  
5. δ-Robust computation: Computation of the target location estimate is robust 
against malicious input up to degree δ, whereδ  is the tolerable location error.  
Our Approach 
The correctness of the protocol is given in Appendix A, where we show that the 
protocol converges to the true result within a finite number of iterations. In other 
words, when we have reasonable inputs, the system provides reasonable outputs. We 
now examine the security of the protocol. For this we prove how the security 
properties identified above are preserved in the face of various attacks.  
Our adversary can launch various attacks against the protocol as well as the data 
that is carried by the protocol. It can leverage deployment characteristics (for e.g., ad 
hoc nature, wireless medium, etc) and try to subvert the protocol. In this section, we 
will characterize these attacks and prove one or more of the following: (1) that the 
adversary cannot launch these attacks due to sufficient protection mechanisms, (2) the 
probability that such attacks can be successful is negligible due to time or 
computational infeasibility, (3) that the protocol is robust against certain attacks up to 




1. Replay, Redirect attacks: 
Replay attacks occur when an adversary stores a copy of a message and replays it 
at a later time after the original message was intended to be used. We examine the 
case where an adversary Trudy records an (encrypted) message (1) sent by Bj to 
leader A (Refer Fig 7.). After some time ′t  has elapsed, Trudy replays message 1, 
which is accepted by A. If the elapsed time ′t  (relative to A) is greater than the 
window of validity for the measurement, then the freshness verification will fail 
and A will discard the request as per protocol. If on the other hand, the elapsed 
time  is smaller in value than the window in which the original message would 
have been accepted, then by virtue of N being a true crypto-quality nonce, A will 
detect the replay comparing the nonce with currently stored nonces. The existence 
of a match asserts that A has seen this message before. It is worth noting that a 
node only needs to store a nonce until the time window of validity of the 
measurement. A node need not store a nonce beyond this expiry since a message 
can be rejected on the basis that the time stamp is no longer fresh. We can do this 
because both the nonce and the time stamp are committed by the sender. Since 
timestamps can only advance from the previous message, and nonces are required 
to be unique across a large time window, replayed messages cannot be successful. 
′t
Thus, the presence of timestamps and nonces in the messages serves as an 
adequate countermeasure to this type of attack. The same applies to message (1) 
of Phase 2 which can be stored and replayed by an adversary. Thus, we see that 
simply replaying an older message is not a successful attack.  
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A redirect attack occurs when a message is sent to a third entity instead of the 
intended participant. It can manifest in two ways, with original message 
suppression and without. In the former case, the original message is suppressed 
from reaching the receiver and redirect to a different entity, whereas in the latter 
case, the message is “replayed” to a different entity and not the originally 
intended recipient without having suppressed the original message. We argue that 
in a wireless medium only the latter is a valid attack because message suppression 
in a wireless medium is difficult to achieve. Subsequently, there are various 
physical and mac layer techniques like spread spectrum [69] etc that sufficiently 
mitigate these attacks. Therefore, we only consider the former case in our 
analysis.  
Let us examine the case where adversary Trudy redirects message (1) to a 
different node A2. Since the message is encrypted in the public key of A1, A2 will 
not be able to successfully decrypt the message and drop it.  
 
2. Insert, Fabricate 
An insert is an attack where an adversary inserts a completely new message into 
the system (fabrication). Inserting a fabricated message essentially results in the 
message being accepted by the algorithm if an adversary possesses any legitimate 
signature key.  This is because signatures are not tightly coupled with the 
identities of the nodes. Hence an adversary can supply any signed message and it 
will be accepted. The effect of fabricated messages on t he target estimate is 




3. Delay, False timing 
This type of attack occurs when nodes behave in a Byzantine manner 
(malfunctioning or exhibit arbitrary behavior). A node may send a measurement 
with incorrect timing values or send messages after a long delay. Two things 
happen here. One, when a node sends a message after a long delay, the watchdog 
nodes will flag the node. Second, if the delay is too long, the message may simply 
be discarded due to loss of freshness. False timing messages are rejected if the 
time is too distant (past or future) from the current processing window. If not, 
messages will be accepted and integrated into the target estimate.  
 
4. Masquerade (Impersonation) 
A masquerade attack occurs when a user presents itself to the system as another 
user, usually a legitimate one. (Note that this attack is different from a 
compromise and takeover attack.) This may be done in order to gain unauthorized 
access to information or resources, to disseminate (mis)information in another’s 
name, or to block or deny a system from operating correctly. [60]  
A malicious node Trudy may masquerade as a legitimate leader node to 
accumulate input messages or as a B node to insert false messages. In the former 
case, since messages are sent encrypted with the public key of the real leader 
node, a masquerading leader node can derive no benefit. Similarly, as a 
masquerading type B node, an adversary cannot forge the credentials of a 
legitimate type b node as it is against the property of the cryptosystem employed. 
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It can, however, falsely sends a fabricated message to A which is made to appear 
as if it came from B. The message will be successfully received at A since the 
adversary can generate an arbitrary signature and encrypt the message using A’s 
public key. When the fabricated message is received at A, A checks to see if the 
data is acceptable. Since all messages in the network are encrypted, an adversary 
does not know what an acceptable value is. It can only generate a message and 
hope that it is accepted with probability pβ (See Section 3.2) The result is that 
fabricated messages are accepted by our system if they are signed using any 
legitimate signing key. The impact of accepting fabricated messages is dealt with 
in the robustness analysis in the earlier section. (To summarize, we have seen that 
the algorithm can survive a large number of dishonest nodes provided the 
frequency of input is bounded.)  
 
5. Man in the middle 
A man in the middle (MITM) attack is one in which the attacker intercepts 
messages in an exchange and then retransmits them, (sometimes substituting its 
own crypto primitives in place of the requested one) so that the two original 
parties still appear to be communicating with each other. The attack may be used 
to intercept, read or alter messages without the knowledge of either transacting 
party. 
As indicated in the previous attack capture, suppression, selective jamming are 
not easy to achieve in a wireless medium. Various techniques at the physical and 
mac layer sufficiently reduce the possibility and question the practicality of these 
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attacks. One seemingly practical way of launching a MITM is if the adversary can 
send a message before the original is received at the recipient or to quickly 
compute a response and send before legitimate reply reaches the intended 
recipient. A multi-hop path is more conducive to this type of attack due to the 
practicality of creating a middle man message before the legitimate responder can 
create it. Since there is no multi-hop communication in our protocol, the 
practicality of this attack comes under question. Assuming that such an attack is 
possible, we analyze the effects of such an event occurring. The biggest deterrent 
for this type of attack is the use of cryptographic keys. Further, the protocol is 
asymmetric in both directions (in both Phase 1 and 2) and MITMs require 
symmetric message exchanges.  
 
6. Capture/compromise 
A capture attack is whereby an adversary can subvert a legitimate node and take 
control of it. Capture and Compromise are used interchangeably. If Trudy 
captures a type b node, it can easily generate legitimate messages (with fraudulent 
data) using B’s shared keys. This will result in lots of false data passing 
undetected through the particle filtering system. When falsified data is accepted 
by the system, the robustness analysis comes into play. We have seen as per our 
robustness analysis that as long as the frequency of inputs from a B node does not 
exceed vmax (the allowable maximum frequency without being detected as an 
outlier), the target estimate (output) will be within δ of the true estimate.  
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Capture multiple nodes: We have seen from our robustness analysis that if an 
adversary wants to disrupt the target estimate, then it has to compromise a very 
large number of nodes in a single neighborhood. Since our algorithm incorporates 
a moving leader approach whereby the aggregator function moves from leader to 
leader as the target moves through the sensing field, at any given time only those 
leaders and type B nodes are active which are in the neighborhood of a target. 
Therefore, in order to disrupt the target estimate an adversary has to undertake the 
Herculean task of guessing correctly which leader node (and cluster) will be 
active next (alternatively guess the pattern) and then compromise that cluster 
within the short amount of time that the target remains in the vicinity and the 
aggregation function is resident on that leader node. This is very difficult to 
achieve in practice even for an extremely capable adversary (due to the small time 
duration in which such a massive attack needs to be completed). Therefore, such 
an attack is not practically possible (unless there exist a large number of colluding 
adversaries).  
7. Lying nodes, anomalous behavior: If a node behaves in a manner inconsistent 
with the nature of the neighborhood (for example, if none of the nodes in the 
neighborhood report spotting a target but only one node does) then watchdog 
nodes will make a note of this anomaly. Repeated anomalous behavior can result 





3.4 Factors affecting performance, reliability and accuracy  
3.4.1 Topological Dependence 
 
Figure 9 depicts common sensor network topologies like the star, cluster, tree and 
hierarchical arrangement of sensor nodes.  
 
 
Figure 9: Basic Topologies 
 
Few additional derivatives of these structures are binary tree structure, fan outs, 
linear, mesh, and ring. While the ring arrangement is the most uncommon form for a 
sensor network, it provides multiple (at least two) distinct paths to a destination with 
roughly the same cost and is used in some sensor network algorithms like CHORD. 
Full mesh and star topologies have higher overheads than tree based or hierarchical, 
but provide a rich assortment of data which is very helpful for particle filtering based 
techniques. Also this arrangement is least affected by mobility. Star topologies are 





popular topological arrangements as they are more ‘hybrid’ and well adapted. They 
form a semi hierarchical, semi star/mesh arrangement, where members of a 
cluster/cell have a unique arrangement with each other (star or mesh) and each cluster 
has a connection with neighboring clusters to form an overlay that eventually 
connects and brings together the entire topology of the network. Based on our 
convergence results and error analysis we find that linear and tree type topologies are 
weaker than cluster or star/fan out arrangements. The former converge slower, the 
effective loss probability is higher, and error propagation causes the results to be 
more pronouncedly inaccurate than a cluster based approach that is well grounded 
due to its hybrid nature.  
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Figure 11: Effect of Topology on Convergence 
 














⎡ −  where c is a constant,  π is the posterior 
distribution importance function at time t from which particles are drawn, ϕ  is the 
transition kernel of the filter, and N is the number of particles per target in the given 
computation window. From this equation, we can see that at each approximation, the 
MSE is inversely proportional to the number of particles N. As the number of 
particles increase, the expected MSE tends to decrease. This tendency which is the 
convergence of the filtering algorithm thus is also proportional to the number of 
particles N. As the number of contributing nodes increases, N increases. A direct 
result of this is observable in Figure 11, where we see the trend of convergence of the 
particle filter for various topologies.  
The cluster based topology has the closest coupling between the leader of the 
cluster and the sensing nodes (all single hop). Therefore, the time taken for each 
 79
 
particle to reach the leader node for aggregation into the filter is minimal in this 
topology. Further, the single hop close knit structure also ensures that collisions and 
retransmission errors also will not be pronounced. For a cluster topology, the 
localized effect is that the density of particles will result in a proportional increase in 
the rate of convergence of the particle filter. 
One could argue that the while the number of particles in a binary tree topology 
cannot be increased, it can be increased in a star as well as a hierarchical network so 
as to provide better convergence rates. We argue that in a localized context the star 
topology can create the dense particle effect similar to a cluster arrangement and 
produce equally good convergence rates, but on a larger scale, the star topology 
advantage will be subdued by the increased transmission delays due to relaying data 
to a far-away base station for aggregation, whereas this problem is absent in the 
cluster arrangement due to single hop aggregation. For a hierarchical network, 
transmission delays from the sensing element to the aggregator will become 
pronounced, as the data gets relayed further and further away from the sensing area. 
The cluster arrangement has an advantage in this regard, that it can not only create 
clusters of single hop neighbors but also form them closer to the sensing area, thereby 
minimizing transmission delays. From a global view point, a cluster arrangement can 
be viewed as a hierarchical formation of star arrangements, where each cluster has a 
star arrangement, and the aggregated information from each cluster is transferred to a 
decision making location through the leader nodes of the cluster.  
Periodic Selection: A final remark is that periodic selections are very efficient and 
have a specific interpretation in nonlinear filtering settings. We have seen in other 
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literature that in this situation the fitness functions are related to the observation 
process. Roughly speaking the selection transition evaluates the population structure 
and allocates reproductive opportunities in such a way that these particles which 
better match with the current observation are given more chance to reproduce. This 
stabilizes the particles around certain values of the real signal in accordance with its 
noisy observations. It often appears that a single observation data is not really 
sufficient to distinguish in a clear manner the relative fitness of individuals. For 
instance this may occur in high noise environments. In this sense the particle filtering 
system with periodic selections allows particles to learn the observation process 
between the selection dates in order to produce more effective selections 
 
3.4.2 Effect of topology on Robustness 
We have shown earlier that our tracking solution is δ-robust to maximum malice 
caused by an adversary local to the neighborhood.  We can further reduce this 
problem to show its dependence on the topological configuration of the 
neighborhood. Essentially, δ-robustness for  comes from the continuous stream 
of input observation vectors that create the robust estimate 
[t nTZ + ]
][t TZ +  at any time window 
[t+T]. The stream of input observations is dependent on the connectivity graph i.e., 
topological configuration (node degree) and the probability of receiving the 
observation vectors from the nodes in the neighborhood. Thus, the robustness of 
 becomes a simple problem dependent on the physical node degree and the [t TZ + ]
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probability of receiving observations from a minimum threshold number of honest 
nodes within the neighborhood.  
 
Mathematically,  
If : Probability that a sensor node a has connectivity with node b within a 
single logical hop in sensor a’s information range. 
( 1nP i = )
)( 1|nP i A= : Probability that a sensor node a has connectivity with node b within a 
single logical hop in both sensor a and b’s information range.  
pD is the average physical node degree. 
Therefore, we can calculate ( )1nP i =  as follows: 
 











n n n n n
n
D












We can also calculate the minimum guaranteed degree that must be maintained in 
order for the above observation [t TZ +  to be δ-robust as: 
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From the above equation, we can see that minimum degree requirement is 
dependent on the each node’s information range, as well as the intersection of their 
connection ranges as denoted by ( )|nP i A .  
From here it follows that, in general, topological configurations with higher 
 i.e., dense connectivity areas also known as cliques, will show greater 
robustness to malicious input observations. Cliques are areas of common connectivity 
between neighborhoods. Among the configurations we have studied, cliques are not 
commonly observable in tree and linear configurations, are rarely observed in star 
configurations and most commonly observed in cluster arrangements. Hierarchical 
clustering topology is therefore a special case of clustering with maximal cliques. 
This is consistent with our observation in Section 3.4.1 where we examined the 
relationship between particle density profile and ambiguity resolution as well as our 
topology simulations.  
( |nP i A)
 
3.4.3 Particle Density Profile 
 
We have seen how topology models changes in the convergence and robustness of 
the particle filtering based algorithm. A closer look at topology also revealed that the 
internal configuration with respect to the topology also directly relates to the 
precision with which the algorithm tracks the target, resolves ambiguities and the 
resilience of the algorithm from being misdirected by malicious entities. A particle 
density profile is the distribution of particle channels across a topological entity like a 
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cluster, representing a transition of particle systems. For a discrete particle system, 













= ∑  
Where 
nt
ξ is the particle at tn. 
For a cluster with uniformly distributed nodes and uniformly distributed anchor 




η ρ=  
The figure below denotes two clusters set up in a wsn. Each cluster has a leader and 
multiple sensing nodes.  
Leader 2
Cluster 2
Type B Clique nodes
Associated with both Cluster 1 & 2
Leader 1
Cluster 1
Type B sensor nodes 
associated with Cluster 1 Type B sensor nodes associated with Cluster 2
 
Figure 12: Clusters with Cliques 
 
As is obvious from the figure, a slightly skewed node distribution will lead to more 
precisely tracking a moving object than a uniformly distribution of nodes in the 
cluster. If every cluster maintains a minimum density minρ below which the low 
density will cause gaps in measurement and insufficient no. of particles to localize on 
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a target location in the presence of noise, then a node distribution that is lightly 
skewed to have higher representation in areas common to multiple clusters will 
consistently produce results close to the true value of the target’s position. By nature 
of being in the communication range of multiple clusters and their leaders, these 
clique nodes can observe and validate data that is being sent by its neighbors in both 
clusters, thereby resolving ambiguities, eliminating false and outlier data, as well as 
counteract malicious nodes. Their exact position with respect to malicious colluding 
nodes can possibly help detect collusions.  
3.4.4 Seed Infrastructure 
 
In many applications, sensor networks have to be deployed in remote, unexplored, 
or hostile regions. Often in such deployments, there may not be an existing 
infrastructure for the nodes to rely on. A similar story exists for ad hoc deployments. 
In the absence of GPS type absolute positioning systems, nodes must rely on other 
nodes to determine their whereabouts. Nodes that are aware of their own positions 
using some external means (often GPS) are known as seed or anchor nodes. These 
seed nodes help other nodes locate themselves. As a condition of accurate 
localization, seed nodes must be localized with a great deal of precision to ensure that 
nodes that are based off of these seed nodes will have a certain degree of precision in 
their location co-ordinates. As nodes localize themselves through seed nodes, some 
error creeps into their measurements. This error in turn propagates through to the 
tracking measurements a fully localized deployment takes. The greater the number of 
reference seed nodes present in a deployment, more accurate is the localization of the 
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remaining nodes in the deployment. On the other hand, increasing the number of seed 
nodes results in a significant amount of overhead as more number of nodes are being 
localized through an external means. For example, GPS requires additional hardware 
receivers. More the number of sensor nodes localized through the GPS system, more 
the expensive hardware requirement, and hence more the cost to deploy. In order to 
keep costs practical, a definite balance between the density of seed nodes to regular 
nodes needs to be determined. In such a case, few nodes can be used as seed nodes. 
Nodes can be localized with respect to these seed nodes in a tier-like fashion. In the 
first round few nodes can localize themselves with seed nodes. Other nodes can 
localize themselves with respect to the secondary seeded nodes, and so on. In such a 
case, however, all errors in measurements made by the deployment must take note of 
this factor too, as error propagation results in slight decrease in precision of 
subsequently localized nodes.   
 
Figure 13:  Collocated neighbor nodes (orange) using different reference node chains 
 
Along with their numbers, location and distribution of anchor nodes is also critical. 
Distribution of anchor nodes must be such as to create an unambiguous coordinate 
system. For example, using three anchor points for multi-lateration results in two 
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possible solutions for a node’s position, whereas adding a fourth node results in 
successfully disambiguating it down to one (within acceptable error bounds). 
Therefore, the distribution of anchor nodes is also as vital as their density. 
Sometimes, as seen in the figure below, having anchor nodes in a particular 
configuration results in a large error creeping into the measurement associated with a 





Mobility models are used to formally describe the pattern of motion of mobile 
sensor nodes. They are useful for various reasons like predicting the next location of 
an entity based on its movement pattern if an earlier location is verifiably known, or 
for disambiguation purposes like ruling out a location. Mobility models thus improve 
precision. For a stationary deployment, the node mobility model is static. Node 
positions never change arbitrarily. Dynamic mobility models, on the other hand, can 
have many interesting representations, and vary from constrained path to random 
walk models.  Essentially, in a constrained path model, a moving entity can follow 
select paths to get from point A to point B (for example a road, walkway, etc). All 
other areas that do not fall on this path are designated as non-traversable, and ruled 
out as possible locations for an entity to exist at. Constrained path models take into 
account location geography and obstacles and are a good representation of a practical 
deployment environment. In the random walk model, on the other hand, an entity can 
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travel in any haphazard manner across the deployment field. This type of model is 
most common for flat, unvarying deployment environments like deserts, water 
surface, etc. Mobility models are entity specific since they contain information about 
not only the pattern of movement but also movement characteristics like speed, 
acceleration, etc and can be used to even differentiate  various types of entities on the 
basis of this information (for example, a battle tank and a foot soldier will have 





Chapter 4 Secure Time Synchronization 
 
Synchronization among the collaborating entities is of paramount importance to a 
distributed system. Synchronization is essential to put measurements into context, for 
general ordering of events, for tracking, tracing a trajectory, for building a historical 
perspective, for replay detection, and much more. For example, in a wireless sensor 
network, synchronization is important to achieve a global view using measurements 
made within a single time frame. Measurements need to be aggregated within the 
same time window in order to be a meaningful representation of the network at a 
given point in time. An isolated event will be noticed by multiple sensor nodes within 
quick succession. This phenomenon needs to be represented in a single window of 
time. At times, an agreement needs to be reached regarding the ordering of sensed 
events, and at other times, a rough time of occurrence needs to be established.  
Different types of synchronization are required based on the need of the system. In 
general, synchronization is done in two ways: Logical clock ordering and actual time 
synchronization. When events need to be placed in real-time context, synchronization 
based on actual time is required, whereas, when only the relative ordering of events 
matters rather than absolute time, logical clock ordering is used. Time 
synchronization can also be achieved locally or globally. Individual distributed 
entities can maintain coherent time with respect to each other using GPS-enabled 
receivers. These GPS receivers allow each entity to individually synchronize with a 
coherent source. Such approaches, however, are very expensive as each node requires 
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a GPS receiver, increasing per node cost (and battery life). This makes it an 
unsuitable solution for low cost or cost-conscious networks. NTP is another popular 
protocol which is used in wired networks as well as over the internet, but is neither 
secure nor applicable to wireless sensor networks. The adversarial model, system 
model and the assumptions secure-NTP is based on is not applicable to wireless 
sensor networks and is hence not adequate for our purpose. Further, optimization for 
energy and bandwidth consumption was not in mind when secure-NTP was designed.  
Other protocols designed specifically for distributed and collaborating networks 
have been summarized below. These protocols were not built with security 
applications in mind [28][32][40][41][42]Error! Reference source not 
found.[56][67][74][83]. For example, in RBS and TPSN type networks a hierarchy is 
created where a downstream node must synchronize through its upstream neighbor. 
Therefore, if an upstream node were to send malicious timestamps to its downstream 
node, the latter would fail to synchronize correctly. Similarly, all subsequent 
downstream nodes would fail to synchronize correctly. A node can claim to be closer 
to a downstream node and cause disruption as well as failure. Lack of cryptographic 
mechanisms can facilitate nodes to relay synchronization messages to its downstream 
neighbors even without actually receiving it, causing the downstream nodes to fall out 
of sync. A further aggravated version of this attack could cause wide-spread battery 
depletion among the downstream nodes due to repeated mis-synchronization. Further, 
these protocols are not very efficient under stringent energy constraints. Few 
protocols have been built with security in mind [43][44][45][55][75]. Some of these 
protocols, for example [75] require pre-shared keys to exist among multi-hop 
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neighbors, which in an impractical and potentially insecure assumption. Further, they 
are not light-weight in terms of computation and energy consumption. [55] states 
various possible alternatives for securing commonly used time synchronization 
protocols. In [75] some sub-schemes are resilient to only external attackers, while 
others are resilient to only internal attackers. The group synchronization schemes are 
computationally not light weight. The authors use the notion of lightweight 
synchronization towards usage of less number of messages. We argue that for a 
deployed sensor network running a on finite energy supply, protocols with less 
number of messages but very high computational requirement are not as feasible as 
running a real lightweight protocol in terms of resource consumption and mission life 
sustenance. Since the ultimate aim of the sensor network is not just time 
synchronization, but utilization of the time synchronization mechanism to facilitate 
other services provided by the network, it would be wise to invest in a low energy 
consuming scheme. The authors have also stressed, time and again, on power saving 
schemes to offset the high-energy cost of their protocol. However, they do not 
address the eventuality that an adversary can take advantage of the sleep 
scheduling/power saving schemes and disrupt the time synchronization protocol. 
[45][43][44][45] are good solutions but for their hardware dependency. For example, 
[45] is dependent on very specific hardware modules for timestamping. [43] is a 
cluster based approach which is very promising, but is not resilient to wormhole 
attacks, and also requires time synchronization as a dependency. We have briefly 
summarized current work in the area in Section 4.1. 
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In section 5.1 we have investigated various attacks against synchronization schemes. 
While there has been a lot of research in the area of time synchronization for wireless 
sensor networks, most solutions either have practical limitations that restrict their 
widespread use, or have hardware dependencies that inhibit large scale deployment. 
Our approach is to create a time synchronization protocol that is robust against most 
practical in-field attacks, does not have practical limitations, expensive hardware 
dependencies and is lightweight enough to be a backbone service. Not requiring 
apriori knowledge of the network deployment, and not having too many trust 
dependencies would be an added plus. We now examine, in detail, various time 
synchronization protocols for wireless sensor networks and their characteristics. 
4.1 Current Research in Time Synchronization 
4.1.1 Review of existing Time Synchronization Protocols 
In the following subsections, we discuss few synchronization algorithms from 
current literature that have impacted our work. We have categorized our literature 
review in the area of time synchronization into two types: review of time 
synchronization protocols, and review of secure time synchronization protocols. Due 
to the body of work in the time synchronization area, we attempt to summarize the 
security pitfalls and shortcomings of the secure time synchronization schemes only. 
Time synchronization protocols built for non adversarial environments suffer from all 




4.1.1.1 Timestamp Synchronization (TSS) 
TSS [42] is a local internal synchronization service where timestamps are received 
and converted into the local timescale of the receiver.  
Synchronization is achieved by calculating the age of each timestamp from its 
creation to its arrival at each sensor node, which includes the time the message is 
resident at a node, and the time taken to propagate the timestamp message from one 
node to another. For multi-hop synchronization, the time taken to propagate the last 
message gets added to the total hold time of the previous node.  Figure 14 is a simple 









Figure 14: Timestamp Synchronization (TSS) 
 
4.1.1.2 Reference Broadcast Synchronization (RBS) 
RBS [32] provides synchronization for a multiple nodes at a time. The time source 
node sends a reference broadcast to a set of client nodes in its one-hop neighborhood. 
The client nodes exchange their receipt times of the broadcast messages and compute 
relative offsets and rate differences with respect to each other. This way, they are able 
to relate their local time clocks to the clocks of their neighbors and reduce their 
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offsets with each other. In the end, a cluster of nodes is relatively synchronized with 







Figure 15: Reference Broadcast Synchronization (RBS) 
 
4.1.1.3 Lightweight Time Synchronization (LTS) 
LTS [40] is a time synchronization scheme that was designed to provide a light 
weight, scalable means of synchronizing nodes in a network. The on-demand version 
which is the more lightweight of the two, provides synchronization selectively to 
those that require frequent resynchronization than other nodes in the network. The 
broadcast synchronization which synchronizes all nodes proactively is the other type. 
Both schemes are built to exploit a spanning tree structure, where the root of the tree 
is synchronized through an out-of-band technique.  In the proactive approach, the root 
floods all the nodes with a broadcast, and all child nodes synchronize with their 
parents. In the on-demand approach, child nodes request synchronization, and 
synchronize with the root node through the reverse path (reply messages) using round 
trip times.  Synchronization messages can be further reduced by piggybacking with 
neighbors who have pending synchronization messages. In such cases, nodes simply 
synchronize laterally with their neighbors.  
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4.1.1.4 TimingSync Protocol for Sensor Networks (TPSN) 
TPSN [74] is similar to LTS. A leader node is elected and a spanning tree is 
dynamically created with the leader as its node. The root node now floods the 
network with a broadcast message following which all nodes synchronize with their 
parents using round trip measurements. Message-delay uncertainties are reduced by 
time-stamping at the MAC layer. However, in case of node failures and topology 




TSync [28] is an external time synchronization technique that uses independent 
radio channels for synchronization. It does so in order to avoid packet collisions and 
any inaccuracies resulting from the same. TSync comprises of two protocols for 
external synchronization: the Hierarchy Referencing Time Synchronization Protocol 
(HRTS) which is a proactive synchronization scheme, and the Individual-Based Time 
Request Protocol (ITR) which is an on-demand synchronization scheme. Nodes 
synchronize with a root node that has access to global time, in a spanning tree 
structure.   
 
4.1.1.6 Interval Based Synchronization (IBS) 
IBS [41] uses finite time intervals to set bounds on the current time. Nodes that 
wish to synchronize maintain upper and lower bounds on the current time. They each 
exchange their bounds and determine a new reduced interval than their previous 
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interval by choosing the lower of the two exchanged upper bounds and the higher of 
the two exchanged lower bounds. They also keep track of the elapsed time and update 
their bounds for the next round accordingly.  
 
4.1.1.7 Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP) 
FTSP [56] achieves time synchronization by a combination of agreement and 
regression. First, a node is selected as the leader based on its ID. (Lowest ID becomes 
the leader). The leader periodically sends synchronization messages to the nodes in 
the network. All nodes update their timestamps and relay the message to their 
neighbors. Each neighbor collects and compares eight pairs of messages and 
computes its new offset using linear regression. This scheme suffers from heavy 
message exchange and additional time loss. In order to minimize some of this loss, 
timestamping is done at the MAC layer.  
 
4.1.1.8 Asynchronous Diffusion (AD) 
AD [67] is a simple time synchronization scheme that essentially averages the 
offsets among neighborhoods. Each node periodically sends a broadcast to its 
neighbors, which reply with a message containing their current time. The receiver 
then averages all received timestamps, and broadcasts its average to its neighbors 
who adopt the newly sent timestamp. In order to avoid random synchronizations, the 




4.1.2 Review of existing Secure Time Synchronization Protocols 
4.1.2.1 Secure Time Synchronization Protocols SOM, SDM, STM, L-
SGS 
In [75] the authors create four sub-protocols for secure time synchronization. Their 
main goal is to create a secure time synchronization protocol that is resilient to insider 
attacks, with minimal overhead in terms of messages exchanged as well as energy 
consumed. They provide three secure time synchronization protocols to satisfy their 
goals. They also provide a secure group time synchronization protocol that is resilient 
to attacks from external attacker as well as to attacks from a subset of compromised 
group nodes. While these protocols are not fully resilient to some insider attacks, they 
can detect malicious attacks on the time synchronization mechanism.  
 




Secure Opportunistic Multihop (SOM) assumes a shared secret key KAB between 
two nodes say, A and B that are several hops away, and wish to synchronize. This 
assumption is not very practical due to the nature of deployment of sensor networks 
in that one can never guarantee the existence of a shared key between nodes that are 
multi hops away or in different neighborhoods (i.e., out-of-radio range of each other). 
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At best, one can only say that nodes A and B several hops away, can probabilistically 
share a secret key. Hence the practicality of this scheme is weak. 





Both the SDM and STM (which follows) have additional trust assumptions 
associated with intermediary forwarding nodes. They assume that these nodes are 
trustworthy and hence are susceptible to insider, colluding and compromised nodes. 
(already acknowledged by authors) 
Further, end-to-end delay between A and B is calculated as the cumulative end-to-
end delay between each intermediary hop. For example, if A-> C ->D -> B then   
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dAB = dAC + dCD + dDB is the (minimal) end-to-end delay incurred. Also, as per the 
assumptions, the expected message delay d is pre-calculated and known for any given 
path traversal. Since d which is determined on the entire route, is a function of per 
hop expected delay plus an additional factor for inter hop delays due to mac layer 
scheduling, channel disruption, etc, an intelligent adversary can cause enough delay at 
each hop, that is only slightly lesser than the per hop expected delay for that hop, 
allowing the pulse delay attack to go undetected for the single hop, and cause the 
cumulative end-to-end delay to be higher than the expected and possibly discarded at 
the end. 
 





In this scheme, multi-hop synchronization is achieved by transitively synchronizing 
each pair of nodes along the path from the source to the destination. Since only pair-
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wise delay is being considered, a practical attack would be to cause delays on each 
link such that the delay would be lesser than the maximum expected delay associated 
with that link, but the cumulative end-to-end delay for the entire path would too high 
to admit successful synchronization. Further, since each node synchronizes pair-wise 
with its down-stream neighbor, by the time the synchronization process propagates to 
the initiator, there is already a considerable drift between the clocks of the first and 
pen-ultimate node. For example, if the synchronization request was sent along A->C-
>D->B, D synchs with B, then C synchs with D, and when A synchs with C, there 
will already be a small skew and/or a small drift from the clock of the source B. This 
skew and possible drift must be accounted for in order for the synchronization error to 
remain bounded and practical. 
 
Ganeriwal et al Secure Time Synchronization Scheme #4: Lightweight Secure 




This protocol is not resilient to internal attacks if G1 is malicious. (acknowledged by 
authors). An implied assumption in this scheme is that every node must trust every 
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other node in the cluster. Thus, it is very easy for an attacker that can capture a single 
node within the cluster. 
This protocol, requires, at a minimum, the computation and transmission of  N-1 
MACs for a single synchronization request and hence is impractical for energy 
constrained deployments.  The modification of replacing this requirement with a 
single MAC signed by a secret key created for the entire cluster is highly insecure. 
Now, the system has a single point of failure if even a single node is compromised. 
Also, due to the use of a symmetric key for the entire group, the MAC cannot be 
verified as having come from G1 (the synchronization source) hence reliability can be 
further decreased.  





In this protocol, 2(N-1) MACs are required to be computed and transmitted per 
synchronization transaction. Hence this protocol also energy-inefficient for the 
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purposes of deployment in an environment where energy consumption should be 
optimal. Further, though the authors claim that this protocol is resilient to insider 
attacks, we can show that this protocol is susceptible to the classic Byzantine 
Agreement Attack [49] 
Using the same example of nodes i,j,k enumerated by the authors, we can carry out 
the attack as follows: 
Nodes i,j,k form a closed triangle where each node has calculated the offset 
between itself and its paired node. Thus each node only lacks the offset value 
calculated between the other two nodes. For the closed triangle, the sum of the offsets 
in a cycle in one direction yields zero if no node is malicious. Practically, the offset 
may not always be zero, due to inherent drift and skew error (as per the authors). 
Attack formulation: We formulate an attack with the offset values set as represented 
in Figure 16. 
 
Node i  (3:05pm) 
-5/-6-5/-5
Node j  
(3:00pm) 
Node k 
 (3:10pm) +10/+10  
Figure 16: Synchronization Example 
 





Table 1: Offset values at each node at the end of Step 2 
 
 
     i ↔ j ,    j ↔ k ,    k ↔ i 
 
i: {  -5      ,      ?      ,       -6   } i.e., {i->j, j ↔k , k->i} 
 
j: {  -5      ,    +10    ,       ?  } i.e., {i->j, j  ↔k , k->i} 
 
k: {   ?       ,   +10    ,      -6   } i.e., {i->j, j  ↔k , k->i} 
 
Each node depends on Step 3 to receive the missing element of its set Oi (which is 
represented as a ? for simplicity) from its neighboring nodes.  
At the end of Step 3, malicious node k sends the following message in place of its 
original message: 
k: {   ?       ,   +12    ,      -6   } i.e., {i->j, j  ↔k , k->i} 
Since the sum of the offsets is not zero, nodes i, j will only detect that there is a 
malfunction in the synchronization mechanism. It fails to identify the malicious node, 
and there will not be an agreement. On the other hand, if instead of a closed triangle, 
a closed quadrilateral was enforced, then a single malicious node can be easily 
identified. In general, the order of the polygon determines the maximum number of 
malicious nodes that can be identified. The number of malicious nodes must be less 





4.1.2.2 TinySeRSync: Secure and Resilient Time Synchronization 
In this paper [45], the authors develop a two phase secure and resilient time 
synchronization scheme called TinySeRSync for wireless sensor networks. They use 
hardware assisted source authentication to authenticate source, content and timeliness 
in the single pair-wise synchronization in the first phase and µ-TESLA based 
rebroadcast authentication to ensure timeliness and authenticity to achieve global 
synchronization in the second phase. The single pair-wise time synchronization is 
achieved using hardware assisted, authenticated medium access control (MAC) layer 
timestamps. Global time synchronization is achieved using µ-TESLA for local 
authenticated broadcasts. The 2t+1 distinct paths between the sender and receiver 
ensure resilience against compromised nodes and Byzantine behavior.  
Though this scheme is significantly better than others, it has some practical 
limitations, scalability issues and high overhead that limits its large scale deployment. 
For example, it may not always be practically possible for a node to have 2t+1 
distinct paths to it from the source or an upstream parent node for synchronization. 
By following a 2t+1 approach, the onus of correctly synchronizing rests on the 
comparison a node makes with atleast t other pair-wise synchronization attempts. 
This can be very wasteful if the phenomenon manifests on a large scale in the 
network. In this scheme, a potential way of mitigating DoS attacks is by decreasing 
the synchronization intervals to a short time interval, thereby reducing the window 
available to an adversary to launch such an attack before the timestamps on the 
messages become obsolete and are discarded. The authors also point out that this 
approach comes with significant cost, both in terms of energy spent for synchronizing 
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at such short intervals as well as storage requirements due to the fairly long key chain 
generated in the short interval.  
Further, authenticated MAC layer timestamping requires secret keys be exchanged 
between communicating parties, which is a problem in itself, and a dual problem 
because reliable timestamps may be required to create and share keys post 
deployment. Further, µ-TESLA also requires certain parameters be exchanged apriori 
that has not been handled here.  
Finally, this scheme does not mitigate rushing attacks or wormholes that advance 
messages.  
 
Figure 17: Revised Secure Pair-wise Synchronization in TinySeRSync 
 
Figure shows the revised SPS protocol, in which all messages are timestamped and 
authenticated with the key KAB shared by nodes A and B. Node A initiates the 
synchronization by sending message M1. The message contains M1’s sending time t1. 
Node B receives the message at t2. After verifying the message, at time t3, node B 
sends a message M2 that includes t2, t3 to node A. When node A receives the message 
at t4, it can calculate the clock difference δA,B = (t2−t1)−(t4−t3)/2 , and the estimated 
one-way transmission delay dA = t2−t1+t4−t3. Since all messages are authenticated, 
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any modification to any message will be detected. To prevent the pulse-delay attacks 
[75] and wormhole attacks [85] , node A verifies that the one-way transmission delay 
is less than the maximum expected delay. In fact, this approach can detect any attack 
that attempts to mislead single-hop pairwise time synchronization by introducing 
significant extra message delays. Thus, sender A can easily detect attempts to affect 
the timeliness of the synchronization messages.  
While this approach is significantly better than most approaches, their hardware 
dependency, 2t+1 independent path requirement, and high overhead limit their 
widespread use. 
 
4.1.2.3 Fault-Tolerant Cluster-Wise Clock Synchronization for 
Wireless Sensor Networks 
In [43] the authors propose a synchronization scheme for nodes based in clusters. 
Nodes within a cluster communicate through authenticated broadcasts and only one 
synchronization message per cluster is sent. In each round, one node serves as the 
synchronizer and sends the broadcast. All nodes synchronize with this node if it is 
rightfully the turn of that node to be the synchronizer, and the clock difference 
between the synchronizer is not more than the clock difference between any two non 
faulty nodes.  Fault tolerance is achieved through rotation of cluster heads and 
synchronizers. However, if colluding nodes in a cluster take turns to become 
synchronizers, they can in each round, cause nodes to synchronize to values very 
close to the extremal values of the acceptable range (say, close to upper bound k∆). 
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Consecutive rounds of synchronization with malicious synchronizers can cause the 
clock difference to cross this acceptable range. 
 
4.1.2.4 Secure and Resilient Clock Synchronization in Wireless 
Sensor Networks 
In [44], time synchronization is achieved through two means: the difference in 
clock measurements between nodes and their parents across hierarchical levels, and 
through diffusion through the network. In both cases, the authors claim that they can 
tolerate upto t malicious colluding nodes as well as upto s colluding source nodes. 
However, the approach dwells on the availability of 2t+1 independent paths from a 
single source to any node in order to successfully synchronize to correct values. Each 
node needs to compute 2t+1 clock differences before it can determine which clock 
difference values are acceptable. The message overhead is O(|E|)  which for a 
network with 2t+1 independent paths to each node becomes quite significant. The 
total number of messages in one round is n1+ (|V|- n1-1)(3t+1) where n1 is the number 
of nodes at each level which for certain topologies could be disastrous to scale.  
Clearly, this method not only has a heavy overhead, but also time taken to complete 
a single synchronization round is large enough for significant clock skew to creep in 
before synchronization completes. For this reason and more, the authors indicate that 
they require a high precision pair-wise synchronization scheme for their scheme to 
work, which becomes a catch 22 situation. Finally, to tolerate s colluding sources, the 
nodes must have access to 2s+1 clock differences from s different source nodes. This 
makes it highly impractical to deploy. 
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4.2 Properties of a Robust Time Synchronization Scheme 
Properties of a synchronization system that make it robust and dependable are: 
(P 1) Must be robust to single point failure (except reference source) 
(P 2) Must be robust to node failures 
(P 3) Must always complete in the absence of active adversaries and 
communication errors and in the presence of honest participants who are 
compliant with the scheme. 
(P 4) Must be resilient to active adversaries in that an active adversary cannot 
cause the protocol to deviate from the final outcome by more than the 
tolerable upper limit.  
(P 5) Must allow for selective synchronization in the interest of efficiency for 
nodes that send time-sensitive data. 
(P 6) .Freshness property: This property states that a message must be 
acceptable only while it is fresh. A message is considered fresh if the 
commitment associated with the message is not disclosed yet.  
 
4.3 Components of our Secure Time Synchronization 
Scheme 
4.3.1 One way Key Chains and Authenticated Broadcasts 
One-way Key chains: A one way hash is a cryptographic primitive that is, simply 
put, a series of consecutive hashes created from a random seed. The notion behind a  
one way hash chain is that it is easy to compute up till the end value in one direction 
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if either a seed  or an intermediate value in the chain is known  but computationally 
infeasible to compute in the reverse direction. This property of a one way hash chain 
makes it a very popular primitive in applications that are resource conscious, and 
where parties at each end (producer and verifier) can compute the chain in the same 
(efficient) direction. In other words, this primitive is easy to create and easy to verify. 
If the initial value of the chain that is disclosed can be uniquely and non-repudiably 
attributed to an entity then we can achieve source authentication as well. Many secure 
protocols for resource conscious applications like mobile devices and sensor networks 
employ one-way hash chains as core primitives. These chains can be computed within 
few milliseconds as opposed to tens of seconds to generate and verify signatures. 
Recently, researchers also proposed a variety of improvements to one-way hash 
chains to make storage and access more efficient O(log n) [14][88][87], or to make 
setup and verification more efficient O(n) and O(log2n) respectively [19][86].  
In our time synchronization protocol, we use one way hash chain to provide an 
efficient means of providing message integrity and source authentication. The 
security of the technique vests in (1) the computational infeasibility of an adversary to 
compute a hash in the reverse direction and, (2) the infeasibility of an adversary to 
find a message m′≠m such that H(m) =H(m′).  
Usage: We assume a secure weak collision resistant one-way function F (to derive 
the one-way chain), and a secure one-way function H (to produce commitments). The 
generator then generates a one-way chain VN,……,V0, where Vi = F (Vi+1) at times 
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TN,….., T0 respectively. We assume that the generator and verifiers are at least loosely 
time synchronized, with a maximum synchronization error of T∆. The generator 
creates and specifies a disclosure schedule for the one-way chain by selecting and 
specifying T0 and Td , where T0 is the time of disclosure of end value V0 and Td is the 
time delay between the disclosure of two consecutive values. As per the disclosure 
schedule, the generator will disclose value Vi at time Ti = T0 + i * Td, To authenticate a 
value r as being unaltered in transit, the generator publishes r' = H (Vj || r ), where Vj 
is a value that will be disclosed in the future. When a verifier gets r, r', j at time t, it 
verifies that the generator did not yet disclose Vj by checking that current time t + T∆ 
< Tj (disclosure time of Vj). If this condition holds, the verifier accepts r' and waits for 
the disclosure of Vj to authenticate r'. The verifier first verifies the authenticity of Vj, 
by following the one-way chain to the last authentic value. If Vj is authentic then r' is 
authentic if r′ = H (Vj || r). r can be any value that needs to be authenticated or 
verified. In our scheme, r is the time-stamp being sent by each node. Additionally, if 
Vj is uniquely and non-repudiable associated with an entity A (usually the generator) 
then the hash chain also provides source authentication i.e., provides the assertion that 




The optimum values of T∆, and Td are dependent on the specific requirements for an 
application as well as the deployment topology as we will show in our analysis later. 
Also, special attention to the security properties is required during the 
synchronization error marginal interval (Tm + T∆) from the time of disclosure of key 
Km. We leave this as a future exercise.  
Authenticated broadcast:  If source authentication is desired hen a node generates 
its own hash chain, the first element of the hash chain to be disclosed i.e., K0  should 
be authenticated. Thus, the initial element K0 gets coupled with the identity of the 
node generating this commitment. Since hash chains are self-committing, (every 
element disclosed is committed to all subsequently disclosed values) every 
subsequently disclosed element is also authenticated and tied to the generating node’s 
identity.  
Thus, authenticated broadcast is only required for the first disclosed element of the 
hash chain. After that, each element of the hash chain subsequently disclosed is also 
authenticated due to the initially disclosed key being committed to all future keys. 
K0            ←       K1           ←       K2           ←       Km-2           ←       Km-1           ←       Km  
 
|  |          …………     …………     …………            | 
 
1st  2nd      mth (last) 
to be   to be     to be 
disclosed  disclosed    disclosed 








Figure 18: Basic Pair-wise Time Synchronization 
 
This is a simple synchronization technique using Christian’s algorithm [6] for node 
A to synchronize itself with node B. Two messages are required for this 
synchronization (three if B also wishes to synchronize with A). If A desires to 
synchronize with B, it sends a synchronization request message to B at time T1 and 
records the time (T1). B receives the message at, say time T2. B records the time and 
sends A a synchronization reply message at time T3 which A receives at time T4. The 
process of synchronization shown in Figure 18 is achieved by the sender A 
calculating its clock drift ( )2 1 4 3
2
T T T T− − −
∆ =   and propagation 
delay
( )2 1 4 3
2
T T T T
d
− + −
=  with respect to the receiver using the time values 
exchanged.  
For a network wishing to synchronize its nodes with a global time, the nodes will 
synchronize with the node(s) that have access to a global time reference. Throughout 
our work, we assume node B has access to global time and the other nodes, namely A, 
C, E, D and F synchronize with B (Figure 19). 
( ) ( )2 1 4 3
2
d T T T T− + −=Propagation Delay 
Clock Drift T1 T4 






4.4 Our Secure Time Synchronization Scheme 
4.4.1 Adversary Model 
In the case of an internal adversary, we assume that the adversary can be only as 
powerful as the most powerful node in the network, for e.g., in the case of a 
heterogeneous network, the adversary maybe as powerful as the highly capable nodes 
in the network as opposed to the low-end dust-type sensor nodes. While considering 
an external adversary, we do not put a bound on the capabilities of the adversary since 
an external adversary could have the latest and greatest resources at its disposal. 
However, we can restrict the possible attacks that an external adversary can launch 
from outside the network since it does not have the obvious advantage that an insider 
may have (for e.g., shared secret keys if any, passive eavesdropping on a secured 
channel, etc) Finally, if an (external) attacker is able to compromise existing nodes, 
its capabilities of injecting and extracting information from within the network is 
limited by the capability of the compromised node(s). Besides these, the adversary 
can record, alter, reuse, insert, masquerade, replay, rush, fabricate messages, and 
collude with other adversaries. An adversary, however, cannot redirect, jam, capture, 
stop and delete messages that have been transmitted into the medium.  
4.4.2 Assumptions 
We start with a few practical and simple assumptions. Firstly, at least one node has 
access to a global time reference. All nodes will synchronize with this source 
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eventually.  If there are multiple root/leader nodes, they should all have access to an 
external unalterable coherent time reference. Nodes that have access to global time 
references are always stationary. Global time kept by any node is always orders of 
magnitude more accurate than the accuracy achieved by single-hop synchronization. 
We require no trust assumptions, except the obvious one, where the node that has 
access to a global time reference is trustworthy. Nodes must store nonces for as long 
as the average key disclosure times. Average key disclosure times and 
synchronization interval together affect storage cost. Shorter synchronization 
intervals result in more nonces being stored while key are pending disclosure. The 
tradeoff is simply determined based on application specific requirements.  
 
4.4.3 Protocol Specification  
4.4.3.1 Notations and Definitions 
1. We define all participating principals { }  ∈ A, B, C, D, E P where P is the set of 
all principals desiring to synchronize. Further, P comprises of all honest (H) 
as well as all corrupt (C ) principals inside the network. No principals share 
secrets apriori.  
2. The initial authentication element that allows each node to authenticate any 
commitment it generates is established prior to time synchronization and is 
not dependent on it.   
3. Principals are aware of their upstream and downstream neighbors as well as 
the source they synchronize with. 
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4. It is highly desirable but not necessary for a  node to know its distance from 
the source it synchronizes with.  
5. denotes a message M sent from principal A  to 
principal B , and reads “At  node A sent message 
{:  ,→
1 2T T 1
A B A,B }T
1T { }, 1A,B T  to B, which was 
received at B at local time . In general, Node X (send time at sender)  (receive time at 
receiver) Node Y: {Contents of message} represents a single synchronization 
message. 
2T
6. n is the known maximum depth of the tree and m is the # hops to a target node 
if known. If not known sender assumes m=n. 
7. Nx is the crypto-quality nonce from principal X. 
8. Kj  is the key disclosed at time j.  
9. H is the secure one-way function used to derive verifiable time commitments. 
10. F is a secure weak collision resistant one-way function to derive one-way key 
chains. 
11.  represents the local time of node at instance i, and  TCAB which represents a 
time commitment between  A  and B is the collision free hash that contains a 
temporary secret and a time value that the sender commits itself to upfront.  
iT























Figure 19: (a) Single hop (b) multi-hop 
          
Protocol Description 
Case 1: Single hop synchronization 
 
Figure 19 (a) represents the single hop time synchronization scenario. If B is the 
source of global time for a subset of the network (as shown), then A synchronizes 
with B. As per the basic description earlier, A sends a synchronization request 
message to B. Through this message A additionally commits its current time value T1 
publicly by creating a time commitment TCAB which locks in the value of A’s time 
apriori. Specifically, the commitment contains the identities of the sender and 
receiver (in our example A and B), the synchronization request time T1, the depth of 
the tree from source B to A (which for a single hop is 1), a crypto quality nonce NA, 
and a one way hash chain value Km which serves as the temporary secret. When B 
receives the synchronization request, it checks to see if the hashed commitment is 
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stale i.e., if the hash chain value Km has already been disclosed, and that the time 
remaining till exposure of the secret is not too large. This ensures that the message is 
not a replay, not too old to process, not too early that it amounts to futile storage cost 
for B, and also to avoid clocks to fall out of synch if the interval is too large. If the 
message is acceptable, then B waits for the key to be disclosed. At a suitable time as 
per the disclosure schedule, A discloses a value from the hash chain Kj at time Tj. On 
disclosure, B can verify that the time commitment was indeed produced legitimately 
by the generator of the secret key by following the hash chain to the end. If it verifies 
correctly, B sends the synchronization reply message which includes B’s timestamps 
T2 (message receipt time), T3 and (response message send time). Similar to A, B also 
authenticates its time values by including a commitment of its receive time T2 and 
send time T3 in the synchronization reply message. The steps are shown below: 
 
Case 1: Single Hop →A  B  
At A: 
Compute time commitment [A-B] TCAB: 
TCAB = { H (Km | T1 | NA |P) } ; m<n, P=(A| B| m) 
(1) { }:  , ,→
1 2T T 1 A AB
A B A, B T N ,TC ,m, (m)H  
At B:  
If hash chain key has not been exposed, and time interval is not too much in 
the future or in the past, process the request: 
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(2) { }:  , , , ′→
3 4T T 2 3 A B BA
B  A B A, T T N , N ,m ,TC  
Verify Time on key disclosure. If true 1T
Synchronize A. 
Else, discard request. 
 
At A: 
 Calculate offset and delay (Synchronize with B) 
If bi-directional, 
 Repeat procedure at B. 
 
Case 2: Multi hop synchronization 
 
Figure 19 (b) represents the multi hop time synchronization scenario. If B is the 
source of global time for a subset of the network (as shown), then A attempts to 
synchronize with B through C, D. Similar to the single hop case, each node on route to 
the source will perform time commitments (MACs) over the previous node’s 
commitment. Thus there will be a nested series of commitments that serve to not only 
authenticate the time values of each node along the path but also to assert and verify 
the path and set a temporal order amongst node along the same path to the source. We 
show subsequently how these play an important part in mitigation some special 
attacks.  
In the multi hop case, A now sends a synchronization request message for B to C.       
As before, through this message A commits its current time value T1 publicly by 
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creating a time commitment TCAB which locks in the value of A’s time apriori. The 
commitment contains the identities of the sender and receiver (in our example A and 
B), the synchronization request time T1, the depth of the tree from source B to A if 
known to A, a crypto quality nonce NA, and a one way hash chain value  which 
serves as the temporary secret. If A does not know the number of hops to the source, 
it can assume m to be equal to the maximum depth of the tree n. When C receives the 
synchronization request, it checks to see if the hashed commitment is stale i.e., if the 
hash chain value has already been disclosed, and that the time remaining till 
exposure of the secret is not too large. If the message is acceptable, then C computes 
the next message and adds its own nested commitment to the message 
as shown below. This process continues for all nodes along the path 
until the synchronization message reaches B. B waits for the keys to be disclosed. At a 
suitable time as per their disclosure schedules, D, C and A disclose a value from their 





( AB CTC C, TC )
, ,D C Aj k lK K K , ,
D C A
j k lT T T .  On disclosure, B can verify 
that the time commitment was indeed produced legitimately by the generator of the 
message by following the hash chain to the end. If it verifies correctly, B sends the 
synchronization reply message which includes B’s timestamps T6 (message receipt 
time), T7 and (response message send time). The downstream messages follow the 
same pattern as the upstream messages. If all nodes along the path are honest, this 
technique allows not only A, but also all nodes along the path to B to correctly 




Case  2: Multi-Hop → → →A  C  D B  
At A: 
Compute time commitment [A-B TCAB]: 
 If # hops to B known, select m=# hops 
Else, m= n 
Time Commitment [A-B] TCAB = { H(Km | T1 | NA | P  )  };m<n, P=(A| B| m) 
(1) { }:  , , , ( )m→ H
1 2T T 1 A AB
A C A, B T N ,m,TC  
At C: 
If hash chain key has not been exposed, and time interval is not too much in the 
future, or in the past, process the request: 
(2) ( ){ }:  , , , , ,→3 4T T 2 3 1 A C AB CC D A,B C T T T N ,N , m,TC C, TC  
Else, discard request. 
At D: 
If hash chain key has not been exposed, and time interval is not too much in 
the future, or in the past process the request: 
(3) 
( )( )
, , , , , , ,
:  
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪→ ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
5 6
4 5 2 3 1 A C D
T T
AB C D
A,B C D T T ,T T T N ,N ,N , 
D B
m, TC D,TC C, TC
 
Else, discard request. 
At B: 
If hash chain key has not been exposed, accept message and wait for disclosure.  
On disclosure, first verify key by following hash chain.  
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If hash verifies correctly, process the request: 
  Time-stamp is authentic if ( )|=AB m 1 ATC K |T |N PH  and so on 
  Observed Propagation time/Transit time = True Transit time if all hashes  
verify correctly. 
Else, discard request. 
(4) { }:  , , , ′→
7 8T T 6 7 A B C D BA
B  D (A.C.D.B), B A, T T N , N , N , N , m ,TC          
Synchronize with A in the reverse order. 
At D: 
If hash chain key has not been exposed, accept message and wait for disclosure.  
On disclosure, first verify key by following hash chain.  
If hash verifies correctly, process the request: 
  Time-stamp is authentic if ( )=AB m 1 ATC K |T |N |PH  and so on 
  Observed Propagation time/Transit time = True Transit time if all hashes  
verify correctly. Synchronize with B 
Else, discard request. 
(5)  
( )
, , , , ,
:  
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪→ ⎨ ⎬′⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
9 10
6 7 8 9 A
T T
B C D BA D
(A.C.D.B), B D,C, T T T T N ,
D  C
 N , N , N ,m ,TC D.TC
At C: 
If hash chain key has not been exposed, accept message and wait for disclosure.  
On disclosure, first verify key by following hash chain.  
If hash verifies correctly, process the request: 
  Time-stamp is authentic if  ( )| | |AB m 1 ATC = K T N PH   and so on 
  Observed Propagation time/Transit time = True Transit time if all hashes  
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verify correctly. Synchronize with B 
Else, discard request. 
(6)          
( )( )
, , , , , ,
:  
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪→ ⎨ ⎬′⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
11 12
6 7 8 9 10 11 A
T T
B C D BA D C
(A.C.D.B), B D,C, AT T T T T T , N , 
C  A
N , N , N ,m ,TC C.TC D.TC
At A: 
If hash chain key has not been exposed, accept message and wait for disclosure.  
On disclosure, first verify key by following hash chain.  
If hash verifies correctly, process the request: 
( )| | |AB m 1 ATC = K T N PH  
Extract values T1 through T12 and synchronize with B. 
 
Of the potential attacks listed in section 5.1 this scheme mitigates attack M1 (False 
timing data/Insertion Attack) by the use of hash chains. M3 (Replay attacks) are 
mitigated by the use of nonces and timestamps. The use of nonces and verifiable 
hashes require a node to wait for the original message from its upstream nodes and in 
the case of a reply, a node needs to wait for the original reply from the downstream 
nodes. Hence M4 (rushing attacks) can be averted. Since this scheme is not dependent 
on shared secrets, compromised nodes do not provide any adversarial advantages and 
hence M5 (Compromised nodes) is avoided. A more thorough analysis would be 
required to comment on attacks M8 (colluding node attack) and M9 (Power save 





Chapter 5 Analysis of Secure Time Synchronization 
In this section, we will analyze the working of the protocol under special attack 
scenarios. We show that in the face of each of the attacks mentioned below, the 
properties of the designed time synchronization scheme are satisfied and that the protocol 
does not terminate at an undesirable state.  
5.1 Attacks against Time Synchronization 
The schemes discussed above in Section 4.1.1 are meant for non-adversarial scenarios 
due to which simple attacks by malicious nodes to foil the synchronization process will 
be successful. Few schemes discussed in Section 4.1.2 which are intended for adversarial 
environments are also susceptible to various attacks. In this section, we summarize some 
of the common attacks that can be launched against time synchronization schemes. These 
are: 
(M 1) Malicious Nodes send false timing data/Insertion Attack: In RBS & TPSN 
type of schemes where hierarchical synchronization is done, if a non root 
node at the upper level sends malicious timestamps to the nodes below it, all 
the downstream nodes will fail to synchronize correctly. For e.g., if n2 
synchronizes through n1, then if n1 sends malicious data to n2, n2 will end up 
synchronizing to the incorrectly inserted value. Thus the entire 
synchronization process can be disrupted. 
(M 2) Malicious nodes jam data &/or delay messages: Sometimes, a malicious node 
does not have to alter a timing message before forwarding. It can simply 
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jam/block the message from being received by a node under attack. Another 
attack would be simply delaying the message instead of jamming it.  
(M 3) Malicious nodes replay older messages: An older message maybe replayed to 
trick the downstream nodes into synchronizing with an incorrect timestamp. 
(M 4) Malicious receiver can send next message before receiving the request: A 
malicious receiving node, can forward a time-stamped request to its 
downstream node without receiving a legitimate request from its upstream 
node. Another variation would be when a malicious receiver sends a reply 
message back to the upstream node before receiving a message back from its 
downstream nodes. 
(M 5) Compromised node: If a legitimate node gets compromised, all secrets in 
possession of the node can be used by the attacker to carry out new attacks. 
These include sending legitimate requests, fabricating or masquerading as a 
legitimate user, etc A clever adversary can very easily use this to its 
advantage and foil the synchronization procedure. A worse scenario would be 
if the adversary is able to deplete the battery of other nodes in the otherwise 
secured network by tricking the nodes into legitimately synchronizing with 
itself repeatedly. 
(M 6) Colluding nodes: Any number of colluding nodes can cause worm holes or 
collectively fabricate data in the network causing time synchronization 
protocols based on propagation delay and neighbor time values to fail. 
(M 7) Power Save Mode Attacks: These types of attacks are possible in power-
conscious networks where some power-saving schemes are being used for 
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optimizing and prolonging battery life of the nodes. An adversary that has 
knowledge of the power-saving / sleep scheduling schemes used in a network 
can optimize its own behavior to take advantage of it and foil the 
synchronization procedure. Thus, if such schemes are being employed, we 
stress that an analysis under such conditions is equally important.  
In this work, we do not consider the attacks on the hash chaining method itself, (for 
example, reusing hash key indices, reusing older hash keys, etc), which are well 
documented and protected against in works like [3]. 
5.1.1 Replay and Redirect Attacks 
 
Replay attacks occur when an adversary stores a copy of a message and replays it at a 
later time after the original message was intended to be used. We examine the single hop 
case where T is an adversary that records message 1 sent by A to B (Refer section 
4.4.3.2). After some time  has elapsed, T decides to replay message 1 to B. Since the 
message is neither signed nor encrypted B has no way of knowing that the message 
originally came from A. As a result, B accepts the message initially. If the elapsed time 
is greater than the disclosure time, and the hash chain commitment (key Km) has been 
disclosed already, the freshness verification will fail and B will discard the request as per 
protocol. If on the other hand, the elapsed time
′t
′t
′t  is lesser than the time left for disclosure 
(i.e., key disclosure corresponding to this message has not occurred yet) then if N is a true 
crypto-quality nonce, B will detect the replay comparing the nonce with currently stored 
nonces. The existence of a match makes the assertion to B that it has seen this message 
before. It is worth noting here that a node only needs to store a nonce until a little longer 
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than the time window of validity of the nonce. A nonce expires when the commitment 
key associated with a message (and hence with the nonce) is disclosed. A node need not 
store a nonce beyond this expiry since a message can be rejected on the basis that the 
time stamp is no longer fresh. We can do this because both the nonce and the time stamp 
are committed by the sender. Since timestamps can only advance from the previous 
message, and nonces are required to be unique across a large time window, replayed 
messages cannot be successful. 
Thus, the presence of timestamps and nonces in the messages serves as an adequate 
countermeasure to this type of attack. The multi-hop case is similar to the single hop case 
and no new additional information is made available to the adversary. In both the single 
hop as well as the multi-hop case, we see that simply replaying an older message is not a 
successful attack.  
A redirect attack occurs when a message is sent to a third entity instead of the intended 
participant. It can manifest in two ways, with original message suppression and without. 
In the former case, the original message is suppressed from reaching the receiver and 
redirect to a different entity, whereas in the latter case, the message is “replayed” to a 
different entity and not the originally intended recipient without having suppressed the 
original message. We argue that in a wireless medium only the latter is a valid attack 
because message suppression in a wireless medium is difficult to achieve. Subsequently, 
there are various physical and mac layer techniques like spread spectrum [69] etc that 
sufficiently mitigate selective suppression attacks. Therefore, we only consider the latter 




Let us examine the case where adversary T redirects message (1) to a different node D. 
D will initially accept the message and wait for key disclosure to validate the message. 
Since the key commitment TC contains the identities of both the original sender and 
intended recipient, on key disclosure D will find that the message is not intended for itself 
and discard it.   
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Figure 20: Node C masquerading as the source B 
 
A masquerade attack occurs when a user presents itself to the system as another user, 
usually a legitimate one. This may be done in order to gain unauthorized access to 
information or resources, to disseminate (mis)information in another’s name, or to block 
or deny a system from operating correctly. [60]  
A malicious node may masquerade as a legitimate upstream or downstream node or as 
the source of global time itself in order to mislead other (mainly downstream) nodes.  In 
our example, C is the malicious node that is trying to masquerade as the source of global 
time B to A. (Refer Figure 20) If A wants to resynchronize its time after a finite and pre-
configured interval, it sends out a synchronization request message as per protocol by 
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creating its Time Commitment for A B and creating the synchronization message as per 
the protocol description in the earlier section. To masquerade as B, C cannot simply 
replay part of B’s earlier message (as shown above in section 6.1). The only way for C to 
trick A into falsely believing it is communicating with B is by sending a fabricated 
synchronization reply message to A which is made to appear as if it came from B. Since 
disclosed keys cannot be reused [3], and H is a strong pre-image resistant one-way 
function, while key Km is undisclosed, we argue that as per the birthday paradox, 
adversary C cannot find a suitable , X such that'mK ( )' | XH mK = TC  BA - the true reply 
commitment without a significantly large number of tries. Also, the adversary has to 
attempt this before a disclosure is made by B, otherwise A will discover that the message 
it holds is not from B. (Note that if an adversary instead of trying to generate an authentic 
time commitment simply replaces with an arbitrarily computed time commitment, the 
message will still be discarded. We discuss this premise in the MITM attack below.) 
 
5.1.3 Man-in-the-middle (MITM) and message capture attacks 
 
A man in the middle (MITM) attack is one in which the attacker intercepts messages in 
an exchange and then retransmits them, (sometimes substituting his own crypto 
primitives for the requested one) so that the two original parties still appear to be 
communicating with each other. The attack may be used to intercept, read or alter 
messages without the knowledge of either transacting party. 
As indicated in the earlier section, message capture, suppression, selective jamming are 
not easy to achieve in a wireless medium. Various techniques at the physical and mac 
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layer sufficiently reduce the possibility and question the practicality of these attacks. One 
seemingly practical way of launching a MITM is if the adversary can send a message 
before the original is received at the recipient or to quickly compute a response and send 
before legitimate reply reaches the intended recipient. A multi-hop path is more 
conducive to this type of attack due to the practicality of creating a middle man message 
before the legitimate responder can create it. Additionally, in a multi-hop, the 
intermediary node can easily make the end nodes believe that they are communicating 
with each other via a single hop by making itself invisible if the end nodes are not aware 
of the overall topology.  We examine the single and multi-hop cases for this attack as 
follows: 
 
Single hop case: Figure 21 shows a single and multi hop MITM. Nodes B and F are 
involved in the single hop case. F sends a synchronization request i to B 
{ }:  , ,→
1 2T T 1 F FB
F B F, B T N ,m,TC , X1 alters the message by altering the time commitment 
TCFB to ( )ˆˆ ˆ ˆ | | |K=FB m 1 FTC T N P  H , where ( ):P F|B|m  and sends  
{ }ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ:  , ,→ 21 T 1 FTi : F B F, B T N ,m,TC FB to B before F’s message reaches B. (In practice this is 
a very hard thing to achieve). B receives the altered synchronization request message  
instead of i and initially accepts it. When X1 finally discloses the commitment key  that 
can validate , B finds that the hash key  validates the hash commitment but fails 
the authenticity test. i.e., it is not tied to F’s identity. Since B does not need to 
synchronize itself with F, (since B is the source), in the interest of speeding up 







whom B believes to be F. { }4ˆ ˆ:  , , ,→3T 2 3 F BTB  X B F, T T N , N ,m,TC BF . Again, X1 intercepts 
this message and replaces it with { }4ˆˆ ˆ:  , , ,→3T 2 3 F BT BF:  B  X B F, T T N , N ,m,TCii ii'. As in 
the former case, F initially accepts the message, but later discards it without 
synchronization since the hash chain broadcast will render the message invalid. TCAB = 
{ H (Km | T1 | NA |P) } ; m<n, P=(A| B| m).  




No. of  TC bits
2 to 
look for a collision in the time commitment to be substituted, for the message to pass the 
authenticity test, but this is even harder and resource intensive on the adversary for a 
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Figure 21: Man-in-the-middle attacks 
 
Multi-hop: Again with reference to Figure 21, when G sends a synchronization request 
to A, adversary X2  replies to G before A does (similar to single hop case, but much more 
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practical). As in the first case, X2 cannot create legitimate hash chain commitments (in a 
timely manner) matching A or B’s identity and the attack fails.  
5.1.4 Simple Collusion  
 
Collusion occurs when multiple entities, usually with malicious intent, work in tandem 
to achieve more prominent results than when each acting alone.  
 
 
Figure 22: Simple collusion between C and D 
 
In our example Figure 22, C and D collude to give the illusion of a shorter path depth 
and thereby ‘advance’ a message as follows. During the initial synchronization request 
phase, A sends a synchronization request message to C. To give the impression of a 
shorter path, and hence incorrect synchronization values, C simply forwards the message 
to D without adding its own time commitment or following the format of the protocol. 
Now, D appends its time commitment to the message directly after A’s and forwards the 
message to B. From B’s point of view, the path from the leaf node A now looks like A  
D  B. B builds the response message accordingly and send it to D. Now, to maintain hop 
count, and number of time commitments, D forwards the message as is (without 
Time Synch request 

















appending its commitment) to its colluding partner C. C appends its commitment to the 
original message from B and sends to A. To A the view of the network from the source 
would look like B  C  A.  
The presence of the path information component (A, D, B) that is included by the source 
B 
5.1.5 Wormhole attack 
 
 
Figure 23: Wormhole between nodes G and D 
A wormhole is a tunnel in a network, which allows signals from nodes to travel faster 
than normal, or sometimes, gives the impression that messages are traveling through the 
in the synchronization response message in our protocol mitigates this attack. A 
downstream node cannot alter this component without invalidating the integrity check of 
the message. It is worth noting here that if there are three or more colluding nodes along 
the same path, for example if there exists another compromised node between C and D, 
they can effectively mask the presence of this intermediary node along the path and 
advance the synchronization message. This form of attack is a type of wormhole attack 
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 channel or due to the compromise of all the nodes 
ex
ortest path (lesser hop count) than actual. Malicious nodes frequently use this 
technique to cause a large number of messages to be directed through them without 
actually deviating from protocol. 
Consider the case when two nodes significantly apart tunnel messages between 
themselves, either through a side
isting between them to give the impression that they are next hop from each other. This 
will result in the synchronization path appearing smaller than actuality. In our example 
(Figure 23) G and D collude resulting in a wormhole in the network. Thus, if A sends a 
synchronization message to G, G tunnels it to D bypassing C. D sends the shorter (faster) 
message to B and on receiving a response from B sends it back through the tunnel to G. 
Since B sees a legitimate view of the network, it sends a response that reflects the same 
path in the path component, viz., B  D  G  A back. The message will pass all 
validation checks and will be accepted at A if A is unaware of m the no. of hops between 
itself and its source B. If A is aware of the no. of hops between itself and B then it can 
calculate the maximum expected message delay (since it is a function of the send time, 
propagation time, and computation time at each intermediate node). If the total 
transmission time is greater than the maximum delay, then the timeliness of the message 
is under question, and an anomalous behavior may be suspected. Therefore, in the current 
state of the protocol, a wormhole attack is possible if a node does not know the distance 
(in number of hops) between itself and its source.  (Recall that our protocol specification 
dictates that either a node knows the no. of hops m, or then assumes m=n and generates a 
hash chain of appropriate length.) If the condition m=n is exercised, then a wormhole 
attack may be successful.  
 133
 
The attack can be mitigated by the following two ways:  As indicated, if A had 
additional topological information, for example, if the degree m was known to A, it may 
d
5.1.6 Compromised node exhibiting Byzantine Behavior 
 the 
ompromised node, all data stored on it, as well as legitimate use of the identity of the 
co
etect the anomaly in degree using message delay characteristics. Additionally, if either A 
or B have topological/deployment knowledge like the existence of C between G and D, the 
wormhole fails with high probability. With knowledge of system delays, processing 
times, etc and by comparing the actual time taken by a message to traverse the said route, 
an intelligent wormhole detection algorithm can detect a wormhole if one exists (within 
limits of its false detection rate).  Employing watchdogs in the deployment that can 
observe multiple  
 
Once a node is compromised, an adversary has access to all information available to
c
mpromised node. In this sub section, we try to examine the effect of such behavior on 
the functioning of the secure time synchronization protocol.  




















Time Synch request 
Time Synch reply 
 
Figure 24: Arbitrary Byzantine behavior 
 
Consider the following case: A sends a synchronization request message to G who 
appends its own commitment and forwards the message to C. As per protocol, C appends 
its own commitment to the message and forwards it upstream to D. The message is 
constructed in a legitimate manner with a legitimate commitment, however, with 
incorrect timing values. In this case, the messages will validate correctly, and timing data 
will be successfully accepted by all the nodes in this transaction if the timing value is 
intelligently fabricated to be within error limits for this deployment. However, due to the 
nature of the scheme, the damage done by this attack is minimal to zero, depending on 
the location of the Byzantine node in the tree. Nodes upstream from the Byzantine node 
will not be affected as they synchronize with the source through their upstream 
neighbors. All downstream nodes will be impacted, but the effect is more pronounced 
closer to the Byzantine node and reduces as we traverse deeper into the tree away from 
the Byzantine node. The deviation in the synchronization error from the average error 
will be bounded on the upper side by the maximum synchronization error. It is also worth 
reiterating here, that a Byzantine node can not advance timing values, only delay them, 
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that too by a limited range. Thus, in this example, node D synchronizes with source B 
directly and hence does not get affected by the fabricated timing values from C. C itself, 
synchronizes with B through D and does not benefit from causing itself to synchronize 
incorrectly. Nodes downstream from C will be marginally affected. If the fabricated data 
is within band (timing values cannot be reduced, only increased, due to the presence of 
previous node commitments) i.e., σ < σmax, relative synchronization error between G and 
C will increase compared to the average synchronization error in the absence of an 
adversary. However, the delta synchronization error between G and A will reduce slightly 
due to G’s committed time values prior to the faulty synchronization. Thus in the figure 
shown, we recreate the messages from A to G to C.  
(1) { }:  , ,→
1 2T T 1 A AB
A G A, B T N ,m,TC  
(2) ( ){ }:  , , , , ,→3 4T T 2 3 1 A G AB GG C A,B G T T T N ,N , m,TC G, TC  
(3) 
( )( )
, , , , , , ,
:  
⎧ ⎫
⎪ ⎪→ ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
5 6
4 5 2 3 1 A C G
T T
AB G C
A,B G C T T ,T T T N ,N ,N , 
C D
m, TC C,TC G, TC
 
If C is dishonest, it can change the timing value T4, T5, (synch request) and T12, and T13 
(on the return route).   All other time values are already committed, and any alteration 
will result in detection and the message being discarded. Also, these values can only be 
changed within a small limit (lower bounded by the previous commitment and upper 
bounded by the allowable synchronization error), as D may not accept the message if the 
time value is too far out compared to its own clock.  Similarly on the return route, C can 
lie about the true values of T12 and T13 within a small limit only. The result of this is that 
every node between C and the source B will synchronize correctly irrespective of the 
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downstream values. C knowing its own true time values will also synchronize correctly 
(since it has no motive to desynchronize itself). Node G will synchronize with B using 
time values T3 through and T14. As a result, the false values of C will cause some effect 
but will get averaged out due to the presence of time values from other nodes in the path. 
Similarly, A synchronizes with B through values T1 through T16 and the effect of C’s 
false values is further drowned out.  In other words, as the path length increases, the 
effect of bounded false timing values on the entire multi-hop synchronization decreases 
provided the false values are not in majority along the path. Note that, there is a trade off 
here. As the path length increases, the uncertainties associated with each node’s 
individual processing time adds up and creates a non-negligible amount of uncertainty 
over the entire path. We would like to study this trade off as a future goal.  
 
Multiple Byzantine adversaries 
While the presence of a single Byzantine adversary does not significantly impact the 
security of the time synchronization protocol, this may not hold true in the presence of 
multiple Byzantine adversaries. Traditionally, Byzantine behavior is tackled using 
redundancy and thresholding techniques. Common approaches include multi-path 
multiple message approaches, randomizing and splitting data into chunks that travel 
through disjoint paths and are assembled at the recipient node to circumvent multiple 
Byzantine adversaries. Also, impossibility arguments render this problem unsolvable 
unless the activity of Byzantine adversaries is limited to the simultaneous corruption of a 
small number of nodes within a certain time window. We leave the study of multiple 




5.1.7 False timing data insertion Attack 
 
Simpler false timing data/insertion attacks are thwarted due to the usage of hash chains. 
As each node computes a committed time value that is corroborated using its 
authenticated hash value, any other node cannot insert or replace legitimate values with 
false data as doing this will simply result in the hash values not verifying correctly. 
Alternatively, in order for a node to generate a correct hash value it needs to attempt a 
large number of hash computation operations (birthday problem) for a single 
synchronization operation. 
5.1.8 Rushing Attack 
 
The use of nonces and verifiable hashes require a node to wait for the original message 
from its upstream nodes and in the case of a reply, a node needs to wait for the original 
reply from the downstream nodes. Hence (rushing attacks) can be averted.  
5.1.9 Forging Messages 
 
Again, message forgery is mitigated due to the usage of one way authenticated hash 
chains. While a forged message can get accepted by a recipient for not failing any 
integrity checks or lack of obvious anomalies like incorrect nonces, time reversal etc, 
forged messages will fail the authenticated hash chain broadcasts and will be discarded 




5.2 Communication Overhead 
 
We calculate the overall communication overhead in terms of messages sent for each 
synchronization transaction to complete. As per the protocol description in Section 4.4.3, 
n is the known maximum depth of the tree and m is the number of hops to a target node if 
known. Since for every synchronization transaction, each intermediate node sends three 
messages, the first is the synchronization response upstream, the second, the 
synchronization response downstream and the third being the authenticated broadcast. 
Also, each leaf node sends only message, the synchronization request, and a source sends 
two messages, the synchronization response and the authenticated broadcast. 
Thus, for a given transaction, the number of message required per path = 3n. 
Maximum number of messages (for max depth m) per path = 3m. 
 
5.2.1 Communication Overhead over a time period T 
 
Since sensor network deployments run on finite power, it would be worthwhile to 
assess what the communication overhead looks like over a long period of time T. 
Therefore, if the Synchronization interval is set to be Tint, then in a given finite time 








Tm  . 
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Additionally, there is one more broadcast downstream, (final synchronization source 
time disclosure) which makes the total number of messages in the above equation to 4  




5.2.2 Communication Overhead during synchronization in tree 
 
In the interest of optimal time synchronization, we can make use of the tree topology so 
as to reduce redundant downstream between a node and all its children. In this case, when 
a node at level i sends its synchronization request, all sibling nodes that can hear its 
request will cache it and compare their own timestamps with their sibling. When the 
response is received from the parent node, and verification is complete, If an upstream 
node synchronizes with more than one downstream node, then the number of messages 













Figure 25: Tree structure 
Let Ni be the number of nodes at each level i, and Ei  be the total edges between nodes 
at level i and the level above (i-1) Therefore, the total number of messages per transaction 
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can be calculated as: for total number of upstream messages plus total 


























If every node has uniform in-degree per level i, then iiINi NE ._θ=  where iIN _θ  
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Adding the broadcast requests from upstream nodes, we have 
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For our example shown, this becomes 4n messages.  
 
5.2.3 Storage Overhead  
 
From [14], we have seen that computation and communication cost with hash chains is 
O(log m) and O(log m) where m is the length of the hash chain. We now calculate the 
remaining storage cost associated with the protocol. Recall that for every transaction, a 
node has to store values of all nonces occurring within a certain time period T. If T is 
large, then synchronization interval is large and as a result undisclosed nonces will have 
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to be stored for a longer time. Also, until a key is disclosed, entire packets (message 
contents) of time synchronization messages must be stored as well at each node that 
performs verification). Recall that our synchronization message is very lightweight in 
comparison with most other schemes. Each message only contains a single hash value in 
spite of traversing a long multi-hop path. At each hop in the path, the nested hash chain 
commitment replaces the previous commitment with an aggregated commitment for the 
entire path. Therefore, storage costs associated with each run of the protocol is of the 




















Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, we addressed the issue of creating robust services for infrastructure-
less distributed networks, the objective being to create robust infrastructure base over 
which other services can be provided. We selected a wireless sensor network as our 
distributed network of choice. We chose to create a robust target localization service that 
is primarily robust against large amounts of falsified data. Most protocol based attacks 
were thwarted using cryptographic protection techniques like encryption, integrity 
protection using signatures, etc. However, we have shown that not all attacks can be 
mitigated using cryptographic protection techniques. Falsified data attacks are certainly 
immune to cryptographic techniques, and are a real threat to any data centric network. 
Our approach in this thesis has been to minimize the effect of falsified data on the 
outcome of the protocol.  
We showed that by using a particle filtering algorithm at the core of the protocol we 
were able to create a model for an adversarial environment that tackles adversarial 
behavior as noise. By modeling data falsification attacks as statistical variances, and 
limiting undetectable adversarial behavior to within certain bounds, we reduce the 
amount of malicious data that can be inserted into the target estimating algorithm. We 
then showed how our target estimating algorithm is robust against the amount of 
malicious data that is inserted into the algorithm without detection. Our experiments yield 
that the algorithm is highly robust against large amounts of malicious data. We were able 
to provide a bound on the minimum number of particles required to be active in the filter 
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for the resilient behavior to prevail. While particle filters have excellent tracking 
capabilities they are very complex to implement and computationally intensive. We 
reduced the implementation complexity and computational intensity per node by 
distributing the particle filter into two components, viz., the measurement sampling 
component and the aggregation component.  Through a novel use of various additional 
elements like watchdog nodes and randomization features like moving the aggregation 
from one leader node to another resulted in a significant increase in complexity for an 
adversary to launch a successful attack without actually increasing the complexity or the 
cost to the system. This is directly in line with our philosophy of hardening the service by 
leveraging existing aspects of the distributed network. Watchdog nodes provided sanity 
checks in terms of distance bounds, frequency of messages, and anomalous behavior in a 
neighborhood to help eliminate data from such sources at the aggregator. Moving the 
aggregator function across various nodes in an unpredictable manner also increased the 
complexity for an adversary to launch attacks since now an adversary has to first guess 
where the aggregator function will move and then compromise a large subset in the 
vicinity of that leader node. This also improves the robustness of the algorithm to 
temporary failures as target estimation resumes as soon as the target moves into the 
vicinity of the next leader node. Further, using SPSA to cast adversarial behavior as 
perturbation resulted in solving the multi-variate optimization problem with only two 
measurements of the objective function per iteration (irrespective of the dimensions of 
the optimization problem). This resulted in a significantly lightweight solution compared 
to regular particle filtering that is also real-time efficient and facilitates online target 
location estimation.  
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As a secondary problem, we studied time synchronization since it is an important 
service for a distributed data centric network. While we did not follow a similar approach 
as with the first problem with a robustness study for time synchronization, we addressed 
the problem of what it implies to be a robust time synchronization service and how to 
create one that is lightweight and reliable for other services to rely on. We used a simple 
cryptographic mechanism called hash chain that helps prevent many attacks like replay, 
redirection, man-in-the-middle etc and is computationally lightweight (O(log N)). We 
also identified attacks that our time synchronization protocol is not robust against and 
will continue to work on hardening it as a future goal.  
Through this thesis, we have developed an interesting paradigm of leveraging strong 
cross disciplinary technologies as the foundation of a robust service and tightly coupling 
it with cryptographic protection mechanisms. We have understood what it means to 
create robust protocols, that are communication and computationally feasible to 
implement in a power conscious environment. The tight coupling of cryptographic 
mechanisms was complimentary to the target estimation algorithm, and together they 
provide the protocol with stronger properties than what they can individually. 
As a future goal, we would like to address some of the tangential issues that were 
identified throughout this thesis. Understanding how watchdog distribution and their 
density of deployment affects the accuracy of the scheme and how an adversary can take 
advantage of this knowledge is an interesting study.  Further, we claimed that the size of 
the window of validity of target position measurements was tightly coupled with the 
tolerable synchronization error, and affects storage and cost. As another study we would 
like to quantify this relationship. Currently, we consider all nodes except the target to be 
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static. We would like to explore the effect of introducing select mobility models, 
particularly constrained path model, on the target localization protocol and its robustness. 
As concerns time synchronization, hash chains have a pattern of disclosure and a 
predetermined schedule of disclosure. We would like to study the tactics an adversary can 
use and the attacks it can launch if it has knowledge of this schedule. The selection of 
values for T∆ and Td (synchronization error and disclosure time interval) is also 
interesting as an improper selection can provide appropriate windows of opportunity to 
an artful adversary. Finally, we would like to understand how Byzantine behavior affects 
time synchronization and what lightweight protection mechanisms can provide resilience 
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